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Nonretroactivity in Constitutional Tax
Refund Cases
by
CARL D.

CIOCHON*

A lively, but little-noticed drama has been running for nearly two
years now in Washington, D.C. The theme: Nonretroactivity I in constitutional tax refund cases. The players: The Justices of the United States
Supreme Court. At stake: Many millions of dollars in state tax
revenues.
As befits any good drama, more is involved here than initially meets
the eye. The cases are not just about money. Intertwined with the tax
refund issue is a thought-provoking debate regarding the Court's civil
retroactivity doctrine. The Justices' sharply differing views on the retroactivity issue reflect their differing visions of the Court's role as constitutional arbiter.
The drama revolves around a simple question: Whether a state will
be required to refund monies collected under unconstitutional taxing
schemes. With its June 1990 decision in McKesson Corp. v. Division of
Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco,2 the Court seemingly "handed... taxpayers a stunning victory, ' 3 declaring that "the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment obligates [states] to provide meaningful
' 4
backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation.
But in McKesson's companion case, American TruckingAss'ns v. Smith, 5
a sharply divided Court complicated issues that less than a hundred
pages earlier seemed clearly resolved in the taxpayer's favor. In Smith
the Court applied its little-known civil retroactivity doctrine to deny a
refund after the state tax at issue had been held unconstitutional. 6 Then,
7
in June 1991 the Court decided James B. Beam DistillingCo. v. Georgia,
further complicating this already complex issue. Faced with a question
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1988, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. "Nonretroactivity" involves the issue of whether a new rule of law applies to events
that occurred before the rule was established. See infra Part I for an overview of
nonretroactivity.
2. 110 S. Ct. 2238 (1990).
3. Walter Hellerstein, Preliminary Reflections on McKesson and American Trucking
Associations, 48 TAX NOTES 325, 325 (July 16, 1990) [hereinafter Hellerstein, Preliminary
Reflections].

4.
5.
6.
7.

McKesson, 110 S. Ct. at 2247.
110 S. Ct. 2323 (1990).
Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2333-34.
111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43

differing only slightly from that decided in Smith, the Court reached a
completely different result in Beam 8
These constitutional tax refund cases have far-ranging implications.
The past decade has witnessed an outpouring of landmark decisions on
the constitutionality of state taxing schemes. 9 Moreover, several important cases are now working their way through various state court systems, likely heading towards eventual disposition in the Supreme
Court. 10 Clearly, the tax refund issue will grow in importance in the
coming years. Taxpayers who have paid taxes later declared unconstitutional will seek refunds, while the states will try to deny refunds whenever possible.
Smith illustrates the conflict between two competing interests: on
the one hand, the taxpayers' desire for a refund of what was wrongly
exacted; on the other hand, the state's desire to preserve the fisc. Unfor8. See id. at 2448.
9. Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme Court, 1989 Sup. Cr. REv. 223,
223-24 [hereinafter Hellerstein, State Taxation].
10. For example, the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Michigan Dep't of the Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), poses a serious threat to state treasuries and likely will lead to a wave
of litigation. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1733, 1828 n.554 (1991); Hellerstein, Preliminary Reflections, supra note 3, at 336. In Davis the Court held that Michigan's taxation of
retired federal employees' pension benefits violated the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity because it exempted from taxation the pension income of retired state employees. Davis,
489 U.S. at 817. At the time of the Davis decision, twenty-two other states had similar taxing
schemes in place. Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 401 S.E. 2d 868, 871 (Va.), vacated,
111 S. Ct. 2883 (1991). In Harper, the Virginia Supreme Court, addressing the question
whether Davis should be applied retroactively, noted that Virginia alone faces a potential refund liability in excess of $440 million and ruled that Davis should not be given retroactive
effect. Id. at 873-74; see also Bass v. South Carolina, 395 S.E.2d 171, 174-75 (1990) (per
curiam) (holding that Davis should not be applied retroactively), vacated 111 S. Ct. 2881
(1991); cf Hackman v. Missouri, 771 S.W. 2d 77, 81 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1989) (en bane) (in wake of
Davis, taxpayers entitled under state law to a refund if on remand they can prove state procedural requirements were met). The question whether federal law will require states to provide
refunds under Davis remains unresolved. After its decision in Beam, the United States
Supreme Court remanded to state courts several pending cases presenting that exact question
for disposition in light of Beam. On remand, the Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior
holding of nonretroactivity. Harper v. Virginia, 1991 Va. Lexis 146, at *7 (Nov. 8, 1991). It is
questionable whether the Virginia court's ruling can withstand further appeal, since it seems to
represent an incorrect application of Beam. See infra note 315.
In California two controversial taxes presently face substantial constitutional challenges.
A California Court of Appeal ruling that the State's unitary tax violates the Foreign Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution is currently pending before the California
Supreme Court. Barclays Bank Int'l v. Franchise Tax Bd., 225 Cal. App. 3d 1342, 275 Cal.
Rptr. 626 (1990) (holding California's unitary tax unconstitutional as applied to foreign-based
parents with domestic subsidiaries), petitionfor review granted, 806 P.2d 308, 278 Cal. Rptr.
836 (1991); see Nordlinger v. Lynch, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1990) (rejecting challenge based on Equal Protection Clause of United States Constitution), cert.
granted sub nom. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 49 (1991).
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tunately, the plurality in Smith did not confront this difficult problem
head on. Instead, it extended the reach of its civil retroactivity doctrine
and for the first time applied it to a constitutional tax refund case.11 In
contrast, a different plurality of Justices in Beam apparently has narrowed the reach of the Court's civil retroactivity doctrine.1 2 Nevertheless, the Beam plurality's slightly modified approach is no more

satisfactory than the one used in Smith; if anything, Beam further confuses already complex issues.
This Note argues that applying the civil retroactivity doctrine to
constitutional tax refund cases is inappropriate. Part I provides an overview of the Supreme Court's retroactivity doctrine in both the criminal
and civil contexts. Against this background, Part II analyzes the decisions of McKesson and Smith, revealing the failings both of McKesson
itself and of the application of civil retroactivity in constitutional tax refund cases.. It then examines the Court's decision in Beam and discusses
the Justices' varying approaches to retroactivity. This Part concludes
that the Court's current approach to these cases is inherently contradictory. Finally, Part III proposes a resolution. Taking a broader perspective, it argues that, though flawed, McKesson suggests a method for
dealing with the difficult issues raised by constitutional tax refund cases
in an above-board manner, one that takes proper account of the interests
of both the state and the taxpayer.
13
I. Nonretroactivity: An Overview

Should a decision establishing a new rule of law apply to conduct or
events that occurred before the date of the decision? In other words,
11. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2345-46 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
12. Beam, 111 S. Ct at 2447-48.
13. See generally Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a
Proposal,61 VA. L. Rtv. 1557 (1975) (suggesting the Court adopt a consistent policy of pure
prospectivity for law-changing decisions in appropriate cases and establish a workable
procedural mechanism for considering the retroactivity-prospectivity question, in any case that
poses it, as an adjunct to its decision on the merits of the case); John B. Corr, Retroactivity: A
Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied," 61 N.C. L. Rav. 745 (1983) (suggesting that
the Supreme Court should take greater account of practical considerations in developing its
retroactivity doctrine); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10; Paul J. Mishkin, The High Court, the
Great Writ, andthe Due Process of Time andLaw, 79 HARv. L. REV. 56 (1965) (criticizing the
Court's assertion in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), that it has a general power to
decide in each case whether a rule should be given retroactive effect); Walter V. Schaefer, The
Controlof "Sunbursts" Techniques of Prospective Overruling,42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631 (1967)
(suggesting that the federal court should give effect to a prior state court adjudication of a tax
controversy if there was economic adversity between the parties to the state court proceeding);
Herman Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to ProfessorMishkin,
33 U. Ci. L. Rav. 719 (1966) (arguing that all newly declared constitutional rights should be
given retroactive effect); Roger J. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of
JudicialResponsibility, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533 (1977) (arguing that prospective overruling is
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should it be given retroactive effect? This deceptively simple question
has vexed the United States Supreme Court for the past quarter century.
For while the question may appear straightforward, in practice it raises a
host of perplexing issues.
The following overview attempts to provide a framework for understanding the Court's retroactivity doctrine. It begins by describing the
mechanics of nonretroactivity, surveys the development of the Supreme
Court's retroactivity doctrine in the area of criminal procedure, and concludes with an analysis of the Court's civil retroactivity doctrine. But the
reader should be forewarned: illogic and uncertainty have been the
hallmarks of this complex doctrine's evolution. As one commentator
puts it: "[T]he approach of the Supreme Court to retroactivity at any
one moment is difficult to predict. Any given holding will at best clarify
' 14
the present state of the law, or cast light upon past developments."
A.

The Mechanics of Nonretroactivity

At the outset, it is critical to note that there are two distinct types of
questions that raise retroactivity issues. In its usual sense, "retroactivity" refers to a choice of law problem: which rule, the old or the new,
will be used to determine parties' relative rights and obligations?1 5 A
different question arises in the remedial context: once a party has established the existence of a legal right, what sort of retroactive relief should
the court award as a remedy? 16 It is this inquiry that animates the law of
remedies. 17 Each of these two types of questions raises different issues,
problems, and concerns. Therefore, each type requires its own distinct
"thread" of analysis. The constitutional tax refund cases in a sense
weave together these two threads of retroactivity analysis, since they involve both remedial and choice of law questions.18 Indeed, as subsequent
sections of this Note illustrate, the intrusion of remedial concerns into
the choice of law analysis is in large part responsible for the current controversy surrounding these cases. But controversy comes later; describing retroactivity's choice of law thread is the task to which this Note now
turns.
only proper when there are clear demonstrations that a precedent must be overruled, that the
new rule is the best of all possible replacements, and that the hardship on a party who has
relied on the old rule outweighs the hardship on the party denied the benefit of the new rule).
14. Corr,supra note 13, at 761.
15. See Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2443.
16. See id.
17. DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 1.1, at 1 (1973).
18. In a recent article, Professors Fallon and Meltzer argue that the focus on retroactivity
as a choice of law issue "lead[s] to a tangle of confusions." Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at
1736. They propose that the proper framework for analyzing retroactivity questions lies in the
recognition of "a general theory of constitutional remedies." Id.
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Whether a new rule of law should apply retroactively is not a question necessarily answered with a simple yes or no. In fact, there are three
alternatives available to a court confronting this 20question: 19 retroactivity; pure prospectivity; or selective prospectivity.
According to the retroactive method, all conduct 21 open to some
sort of judicial review is subject to the new rule. 22 Such conduct can be
divided into two categories: that which is still subject to direct review,
and that which is subject only to collateral attack (e.g., writ of habeas
corpus). The distinction between these two categories
has often been
23
critical to the Court's criminal retroactivity analysis.
In contrast to the retroactive method, under the pure prospective
method the new rule applies only to conduct occurring after the court's
decision. 24 It does not even apply to the parties presently before the
court.

25

Finally, selective prospectivity represents something of a compromise. Unlike the pure prospective method, selective prospectivity gives
the successful litigant the benefit of the new rule, applying it retroactively
to the claim from which it arose. 26 Under this method, however, the new

rule applies prospectively to all other conduct. That is, it does not apply
to any other claims that arose before the date of the decision establishing

the new rule. 27

The distinctions between these three methods have at times been
crucial to the disposition of individual cases as well as to the general
19. Some commentators note the existence of a fourth alternative, the prospective-prospective method. E.g., Schaefer, supra note 13, at 639; Cameron S. DeLong, Note, Confusion
in the FederalCourts: Application of the Chevron Test in Retroactive-ProspectiveDecisions,
1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 117, 127; Note, Prospective-ProspectiveOverruling,51 MINN. L. REv. 79,
81 (1966). However, it seems that the Supreme Court has never acknowledged the existence of
this doctrine. See Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2443 (noting the existence of "three ways in which the
choice-of-law problem may be resolved"). Therefore, it will not be discussed in this Note.
20. The term "selective prospectivity" has been borrowed from Justice Souter's analysis
in Beam. See Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2444. The same concept also has been described as "quasiprospectivity." See DeLong, supra note 19, at 124.
21. By "conduct" is meant the conviction, claim, transaction, or event that is the subject
of litigation.
22. DeLong, supra note 19, at 125 (citing Comment, Prospective Application of Judicial
Decisions, 33 ALA. L. Rlv. 463, 468 (1982)).
23. See infra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
24. DeLong, supra note 19, at 126.
25. This method has been criticized on several grounds, see infra notes 105-111 and accompanying text. In particular, critics have noted that it may violate the "cases and controversies" requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. See infra notes 326-332 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's objections on this ground); cf Fallon & Meltzer,
supra note 10, at 1797-1807 (addressing the Article III issue and concluding that prospective
decisionmaking, though it may be unwise, is not unconstitutional).
26. DeLong, supra note 19, at 127.
27. Id. at 128. This approach also has been severely criticized, particularly because it
treats similarly situated litigants differently. See infra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
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development of nonretroactivity. Indeed, the relative flaws and attributes of each method have been addressed in often confusing detail as the
Court has struggled to develop a coherent retroactivity doctrine.
B. Nonretroactivity's Jurisprudential Underpinnings
The foregoing discussion of methods presents nonretroactivity as a
fait accoMplL 28 And indeed, over the past several decades, the idea that
courts may or even should decide some cases prospectively has become
unremarkable, 29 if not uniformly admired. 30 But this relative acceptance

of nonretroactivity is a fairly recent development-Linkletter v.
Walker,3 1 decided in 1965, represents the Supreme Court's first departure from full retroactivity. 32 The following sections describe the developments, jurisprudential and legal, that led up to Linkletter.
(1) The Nature of Law
A court's decision not to make a new rule retroactive reflects, at

least implicitly, an acknowledgment that courts make and change law.
This conception of the nature of law and the judicial role, now almost

universally accepted, 33 has not always prevailed. At common law, all
judicial decisions were given retroactive effect. 34 Conceptually, this rule
of absolute retroactivity fit perfectly with the prevailing "declaratory"
theory, generally attributed to Blackstone, that judges do not make laws,
but merely discover and declare pre-existing ones. 35
According to
28. See Beytagh, supra note 13, at 1557.
29. See, eg., id at 1599 (asserting that "nonretroactivity, for better or for worse, is an
established part of our jurisprudence").
30. It could be argued that as a doctrine, nonretroactivity reached its peak in the mid1970s and has been declining ever since. See infra notes 117-124 and accompanying text (surveying recent developments in the Supreme Court's criminal retroactivity doctrine that significantly restrict its reach); infra Part II.D. (discussing how the Beam decision evidences the
current controversy and uncertainty over the scope and propriety of the Court's civil retroactivity doctrine).
31. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
32. Id at 628.
33. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1759 & n. 147. Professors Fallon and Meltzer
cite Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith as a possible rejection of this conception. In light of his
later comments in Beam, however, it seems safe to say that even Justice Scalia agrees that
courts make law: "I am not so naive... as to be unaware that judges in a real sense 'make'
law." James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 2451 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). For a further discussion of Justice Scalia's views, see infra notes 257-262 and accompanying text (discussing his opinion in Smith) and infra notes 325-331 and accompanying text
(analyzing his approach in the context of Beam).
34. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 (1964); Kuhn v. Fairrnont Coal Co., 215 U.S.
349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
35. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69 (stating that the duty of judges is
not to "pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one."); see also Swift v.
Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842) ("[Judicial decisions] are, at most, only evidence of what
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Blackstone, the laws of God are supreme and any law that contradicts
them necessarily is a nullity. 36 Thus, if a court overrules an earlier decision, it is not saying that the old law was wrong, but rather that it was
never law at all. 37 A court plays its proper role within Blackstone's
model only by giving a "new" rule of law full retroactive effect, applying
it to all conduct, regardless of when the claim arose or the suit was
38
ffiled.
The declaratory theory, and its focus on what law ought to be, became the target of criticism with the rise of legal positivism in the early
nineteenth century.39 While agreeing that ideally law "ought to conform" to morals, 4° John Austin argued that it does not always do so and
advocated an approach that analyzes laws as commands made by the
sovereign, not by God.4 1 According to Austin's "command theory," law
is not found; rather, it is made, sometimes by judges acting as the sovereign's subordinate. 4 2
H.L.A. Hart, the leading modem positivist, 43 agrees with Austin's
criticism of Blackstone's
declaratory theory, citing it as one root of the
"evil" of formalism. 44 But Hart rejects Austin's simple model of law as a
series of imperative commands. 4 5 Instead, he posits that legal systems
are best understood as "a union of primary rules of obligation"
(analagous to Austin's commands)" and "secondary rules of recognition,
the laws are; and are not themselves laws.") To call this the "Blackstonian theory" may be
misleading: Sir Mathew Hale postulated a "declaratory theory" thirteen years before Blackstone's birth. See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623 n.7 (citing JOHN C. GRAY, NATURE AND
SOURCES OF THE LAW 206 (1909)).

36. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 35, at *42.
37. See id at *70.
38. See DeLong, supra note 19, at 119. If we accept Blackstone's basic premise regarding
a court's proper role, the obvious corollary is that a court that engages in prospective decisionmaking usurps the legislature's power. Justice Scalia, in particular, has focused on this aspect
of nonretroactivity. See infra notes 326-332 and accompanying text for a discussion of his
views on this subject.
39. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv.
593, 594 (1958).
40.

JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 214-15 (5th ed. 1885)

41. Id. at 510.
42. Id. at 521, 621.
43. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1760.
44. Hart, supra note 39, at 609-10. The other root of this evil, according to Hart, is the
preoccupation with the separation of powers, which he seems to attribute to Montesquieu. Id
at 610. The relationship between formalism and separation of powers will be discussed in the
context of Justice Scalia's approach to nonretroactivity infra notes 326-332 and accompanying
text.
45. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW chs. III & IV (1962) (spelling out in detail the
inadequacies of the command theory).
46. Id. at 91 (emphasis added).
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change, and adjudication," 47 which ultimately are concerned with the
48
ways in which government officials identify and apply primary rules.
Hart recognizes that in analyzing specific situations under such general rules, a "penumbra of doubt" sometimes may shroud the inquiry,
49
since it will not always be clear whether a certain rule applies or not.
In these instances, "at the margin of rules," courts necessarily perform a
rule-making function.50 In this respect, he agrees with Austin: courts
sometimes make law.5 1
This facet of positivism-its acknowledgment that courts sometimes
change rules-suggests a ground for explicitly distinguishing "old" law
from new. 52 In this sense, positivism may be viewed as providing a theoretical basis for departing from Blackstone's rule of absolute retroactivity. When a court declares a new rule, it is merely saying the old rule
was "wrong," not that it was a nullity. By examining what actually is
(rather than focusing on what ought to be), courts may take into account
the fact of the old rule's prior existence-an existence that still may affect
parties' rights and obligations today. And as the subsequent sections illustrate, it is practical considerations such as these that lie behind the
development of nonretroactivity as a legal doctrine.
(2) The Evolution of the Supreme Court'sApproach
The United States Supreme Court early declared its adherence to
53
Blackstone's declaratory theory. In United States v. Schooner Peggy
the Court held that a new law governing seizure of French ships, promulgated on December 21, 1801, was dispositive of a seizure that had occurred on April 23, 1800.54 Though lawfully seized according to the
laws in existence at the time, the Schooner Peggy was returned to its
owner under the rule established by the new law.5 5 Similarly, in Norton
v. Shelby County56 the Court held that unconstitutional action "confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no ofcontemplation, as inoperative as though it had never
fice; it is, in legal
57
been passed."
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 95 (emphasis added).
Id. at 91-96.
Id. at 119-20.
Id. at 132.
See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1761 n.170.
Id. at 1760.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
Id. at 108.
Id.
118 U.S. 425 (1886).
Id. at 442.
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Over the years, however, the notion that judges sometimes do make
law gained increasing acceptanceA 8 A progression of cases reflect the
Supreme Court's implicit acknowledgement of this view. In 1932, in
Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co.,59 the Court held
that no federal right was violated when Montana's highest court refused
to give a new rule of law retroactive effect.6° Confronted with the argument that due process forbids nonretroactivity, Justice Cardozo, writing
for the Court, stated simply that "[w]e think the federal constitution has
no voice upon the subject."' 6 1 And in 1939 Chief Justice Hughes led the
Court one step closer to rejecting outright the idea that law is found
when, in Chicot County DrainageDistrict v. Baxter State Bank 62 he declared that "the past cannot always be erased by a new judicial decision." 63 The stage was set for Linkletter and the subsequent
development of the Court's retroactivity doctrine.
C. Development of the Supreme Court's Criminal Retroactivity Doctrine
Although this Note focuses on retroactivity in the civil context, the
doctrine first was developed in the area of constitutional criminal procedure. Indeed, the Court's criminal retroactivity doctrine provided both
the foundation and the framework for the subsequent development of its
civil retroactivity doctrine. 64 Acquiring an understanding of the doctrine
in the civil sphere requires familiarity with its origins in the criminal
context. Therefore, the following sections survey the history, criticisms,
and current status of the Court's criminal retroactivity doctrine.
(1) Linkletter and the Foundations of Nonretroactivity
Linkletter v. Walker 65 arose in the context of the Warren Court's far
reaching and controversial decisions in the area of constitutional criminal
procedure. Specifically, the case presented the question whether the rule
of Mapp v. Ohio, 66 that illegally seized evidence is inadmissible in a state
58. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623-25 (1964) (outlining the history and theory of retroactivity); Beytagh, supra note 13, at 1560; DeLong, supra note 19, at 119.
59. 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
60. Id. at 364.
61. Id. Another illustration of how positivism carried the day is reflected by the Court's
rejection in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938), of the natural law theories that
underlay Blackstone's declaratory theory, as well as Justice Story's opinion in Swift v. Tyson.
62. 308 U.S. 371 (1939).
63. Id. at 374. In the very same paragraph the Chief Justice stated that "[tihese questions [of retroactivity] are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention
Id. The Court based its decision on res judicata, and thus had no need to
I..."
of courts .
address the difficult retroactivity question. Id.
64. See Corr,supra note 13, at 781.
65. 381 U.S. 618, 628 (1965).
66. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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criminal trial, would apply to convictions that had become final 67 before
the date Mapp was decided. 6 8
The Court in Linkletter began its analysis of the retroactivity issue
by surveying its history. It concluded that, under United States v.
Schooner Peggy,69 "a change in law will be given effect while a case is on
direct review;"'70 but that, with regard to a collateral attack on a final
judgment, there is no "set 'principle of absolute retroactive invalidity.' ",71 And after quoting Justice Cardozo's Sunburst opinion for the
proposition that the Constitution does not address the subject of retroactivity,72 the Court listed three factors weighing upon the retroactivity
question: first, the purpose of the Mapp rule; second, the reliance placed
application of
upon the pre-Mapp rule; and third, the effect retroactive
73
Mapp would have on the administration of justice.
Examination of Mapp in light of these three factors convinced the
Court that its rule need not be given wholly retroactive effect. 74 The
purpose of the exclusionary rule announced in Mapp was to deter illegal
police action. 75 The Court reasoned that this purpose would not be
served by applying the rule retroactively to final convictions, since the
misconduct it was designed to deter (the illegal seizure of evidence) had
already occurred. 76 The Court then noted that both the accused and the
states had justifiably relied on the pre-Mapp rule. 77 Finally, it concluded
retrospective would tax the administrathat "[t]o make the rule of Mapp
'78
tion of justice to the utmost."
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, dissented, criticizing the
"arbitrary and discriminatory nature of the judicial contrivance utilized
here to break the promise of Mapp by keeping all people in jail who are
unfortunate enough to have had their unconstitutional convictions af67. The Court defined a "final" conviction as one "where the judgment of conviction was
rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had
elapsed before our decision in Mapp v. Ohio." Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 622 n.5.
68. Id. at 622, 640.
69. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
70. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 627. This interpretation of Schooner Peggy would not survive
for long. See infra notes 80-94 and accompanying text (discussing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293 (1967)).
71. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 627 (quoting Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State
Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940)).
72. Id. at 629 (quoting Great N. R.R. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364
(1932)).
73. Id. at 636.
74. Id. at 640.
75. Id. at 636-37.
76. Id at 637. Of course, this logic also argues against any retroactive application of
Mapp, since deterrence would not be served by applying the rule retroactively to cases still
subject to direct review.
77. Id
78. Id.
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firmed before June 19, 1961." 7 9 These two related criticisms, that nonretroactivity constitutes arbitrary linedrawing and unfairly discriminates
against similarly situated litigants, would animate future debates over the
soundness of the doctrine.80
The next important step in the development of the Court's retroactivity doctrine occurred with Stovall v. Denno,8 in which the Court held
that the rules established in United States v. Wade82 and Gilbert v. California,83 relating to the presence of counsel at pretrial lineups, would
apply only to conduct occurring after the date of those decisions.8 4 In
Stovall the Court clarified its retroactivity analysis, specifically stating
that it would balance the three factors it had introduced in Linkletterpurpose, reliance, and effect85-to determine whether a new rule would
be given retroactive effect. 86 More importantly, in Stovall the Court departed from the rule of Schooner Peggy,87 recently cited with approval in
Linkletter,88 that newly declared constitutional rules would, at the very
least, apply retroactively to all cases still subject to direct review. 89 Instead, the Court held that the outcome of the three-factor balancing test
was wholly determinative of the degree of retroactivity, because "no distinction is justified between convictions now final... and convictions at
various stages of trial and direct review." 90 Thus, the Court concluded
that the rules of Wade and Gilbertwould not apply retroactively to either
final convictions or to cases pending on direct review. 9 1
Stovall's rule of prospectivity did recognize one obvious and significant exception: both were given the benefit of the rule established in
79. IdL at 641 (Black, J., dissenting).
80. See infra notes 110-114, 228, 313 and accompanying text.
81. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
82. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
83. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
84. See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 300.
85. See supra text accompanying note 73. One influential commentator believes that
these three factors were not clearly presented until Stovall, see Beytagh, supra note 13, at 1566,
and the Court itself has at times implicitly endorsed this interpretation, see, eg., United States
v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 543-44 (1982) (discussing the "three Stovall factors"). However, the
three factors clearly are set forth and addressed in Linkletter. See supra text accompanying
notes 73-78. Cf Corr,supra note 13, at 747 (discussing what Professor Corr describes as the
"Linkletter/Stovall doctrine").
86. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 297.
87. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
89. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301.
90. Id. at 300.
91. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 300-01. A similar, though not identical, result was reached in
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. at 719, 732 (1966) (holding that Escobedo's rule relating to
right to counsel and Miranda's rule relating to right to silence apply only to trials begun after
the decisions were announced).
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their respective cases.92 In other words, the Wade and Gilbert decisions
were made selectively prospective. 93 The Court justified this seemingly
disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants as "an unavoidable
consequence of the necessity that constitutional adjudications not stand
as mere dictum."' 94 At the same time, it recognized that selective prospectivity raises equitable concerns:
Inequity results from according the benefit of a new rule to the parties
in the case in which it is announced but not to other litigants similarly
situated in the trial or appellate process who have raised the same issue. But we regard the fact that the parties involved are chance beneficost for adherence to sound principles of
ciaries as an insignificant
95
decisionmaking.
Whether the doctrine, as it had developed, reflected sound decisionmaking, particularly in light of concerns regarding its fundamental fairness,
would remain an open question, despite the Court's assurances to the
contrary.
(2) Justice HarlanDissents
From the outset, nonretroactivity sparked controversy. Justices
Black and Douglas, for example, were consistently critical of the Court's
early nonretroactivity decisions. 96 But it was Justice Harlan, who had
joined in several of those earlier opinions, who would prove to be nonretroactivity's most influential critic. In Desist v. United States,97 which addressed whether the rule announced in Katz v. United States,9 8 regarding
the constitutionality of electronic eavesdropping, would be made retroactive was the first case to spark a dissent by Justice Harlan. Procedurally,
Desist is notable for first recognizing the threshold question inherent in
any retroactivity analysis: has the decision at issue, in fact, created a new
rule of law? 99 The Court concluded that Katz had indeed changed the
law, and continued with an analysis of the three Linkletter/Stovall factors. 100 After balancing these factors, it held that Katz should be given
selectively prospective application. 10 1
92. See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301.
93. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text for a description of selective
prospectivity.
94. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301. But see Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969)
dissenting) ("[T]here has heretofore been no impediment to producing only dic(Douglas, J.,
tum through a 'case or controversy;' that tradition started with Marbury v. Madison.");
Beytagh, supra note 13, at 1567 (discussing the "ill-advised dictum about Article III").
95. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301 (footnote omitted).
96. Beytagh, supra note 13, at 1563.
97. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
98. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
99. See Desist, 394 U.S. at 248-49.
100. Id. at 249-51.
101. See id. at 246.
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The Court's decision caused Justice Harlan to reevaluate nonretroactivity. After surveying the doctrine's evolution, he concluded that
"'[r]etroactivity' must be rethought." 10 2 Two years later in Mackey v.
United States10 3 he expanded upon his earlier criticisms, mounting a
comprehensive and ultimately influential analytical assault on the
Court's retroactivity doctrine." °4 In Justice Harlan's view, the Court's
doctrine" 10 5 violated three norms of constitu"ambulatory retroactivity
10 6
tional adjudication.
First, he argued that the doctrine allowed, and even encouraged,
unprincipled decisionmaking:
[The Linkletter] doctrine was the product of the Court's disquietude
with the impacts of its fast-moving pace of constitutional innovation in
the criminal field. Some members of the Court, and I have come to
regret that I was among them, initially grasped this doctrine as a way
of limiting the reach of decisions that seemed to them fundamentally
unsound. Others rationalized this resort to prospectivity as a "technique" that provided an "impetus... for the implementation of long
reforms, which otherwise could not be practicably
overdue 107
effected."
Constitutional decisions, according to Justice Harlan's criticism, should
not be made out of a desire to limit other, personally distasteful decisions. Not only is such decisionmaking unwise in itself, but it had, he
to evolve in a comconcluded, caused the Court's retroactivity doctrine
08
pletely haphazard and unpredictable manner.
Second, Justice Harlan asserted that in deciding cases nonretroactively, the Court violated its constitutional mandate to "adjudicat[e]
cases and controversies according to the law of the land."' 1 9 The Linkletter/Stovall factors of purpose, reliance, and effect, he asserted, were
criteria that should inform the Court's substantive constitutional analysis.110 They should not, he implied, be manipulated so that the Court
could make a new constitutional rule "wholly or partially retroactive or
102. Id at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
103. 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
104. See id. at 677-702; see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987) ("In Jusice
Harlan's views, and now in ours, failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.");
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 548 (1982) ("We now agree with Justice Harlan that
'[r]etroactivity must be rethought' "). For a discussion of these two cases, and how they
adopted Justice Harlan's approach, see infra notes 118-125 and accompanying text.
105. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 681 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
106. See Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322-24; Johnson, 457 U.S. at 546-48.
107. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 676 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Jenkins v.
Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 218 (1969)).
108. Id. at 676-77.
109. Id. at 678-79.
110. Id. at 681.
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only prospective as it deems wise."' 11 In particular, Justice Harlan
strongly criticized the Court's practice of "[s]imply fishing one case from
the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new
constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases
by that new rule" as intruding on the
subsequently to flow by unaffected
1 12
legislature.
the
of
province
Third, Justice Harlan argued that the Court's selective application
of new constitutional rules departed from the "basic judicial tradition" of
treating similarly situated litigants similarly. 113 Rules already determined to be wrong should not be applied to litigants whose cases are yet
Black and
to be decided. Here, he echoed the sentiments that Justices
14
Linkletter.'
since
ever
expressed
had
Douglas consistently
Justice Harlan then cited several damaging effects of the Court's existing approach. The continued use of selective prospectivity might, he
suggested, deter litigants from pursuing claims based upon constitutional
interpretations differing from those currently in force, since a defendant
whose case was still subject to direct review would face the risk of not
gaining the benefit of a new rule should a different litigant's case be chosen as the vehicle for announcing the new rule. And more importantly,
by mitigating the disruptive effects of rule-changing decisions, nonretroactivity allowed the Court to cut itself loose from the traditional guiding
force of stare decisis. 115
These considerations led Justice Harlan to conclude that a different
approach to retroactivity was necessary. He proposed that the Court return to Linkletter, and apply all new rules of constitutional law, at a
minimum, to all cases still subject to direct review at the time of the rulechanging decision. 116 This approach, in his view, was the only way to
one hand, and principled and
resolve the coniict between finality on 1the
17
equitable decisionmaking on the other.
(3) Recent Developments in CriminalRetroactivity
In the criminal field Justice Harlan's views have proven influential.
Over the past few years, retroactivity has come almost full circle from
Linkletter, as the Court has nominally adopted Justice Harlan's sug111. Id. at 677.
112. Id. at 679.
113. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258-59 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
114. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 79. It is worth noting, however, that while
Justice Harlan proposed a rule of retroactivity only for cases still subject to direct review to
solve this problem, Justice Black, in contrast, argued for complete retroactivity. CompareDesist, 394 U.S. at 260-69 (Harlan, J., dissenting) with Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 652-53
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
115. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 680 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
116. See id. at 679-81; Desist, 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
117. See Beytagh, supra note 13, at 1572-73.
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gested approach to criminal retroactivity. In Griffith v. Kentucky,118 the
Court held that the rule established by Batson v. Kentucky1 9 would apply retroactively to all cases still subject to direct review. 20° In the process, it finally fully acknowledged the validity of the criticisms Justice
Harlan raised eighteen years earlier in Desist: "In Justice Harlan's view,
and now in ours, failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to
criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication."''
Therefore, the Court announced that new constitutional rules would apply retroactively to criminal cases still subject
22
to direct review.'
With its recent decisions in Teague v. Lane 12 3 and Butler v. McKel24
lar,1 the Court appears to have finished crafting the rough contours of
its criminal retroactivity doctrine. First in Teague, and then in Butler,
the Court adopted, at least in name, Justice Harlan's suggested approach
to retroactivity in the context of habeas corpus: save in limited circumstances, new rules will not apply to convictions subject only to collateral
attack.'2 5 With these standards set, it appears that the Court's criminal
retroactivity doctrine will see little more than fine tuning in the near
future.
D.

Nonretroactivity in Civil Cases

Keeping in mind the history and current status of the Supreme
Court's criminal retroactivity doctrine, it now is necessary to travel back
two decades to the beginnings of its civil retroactivity doctrine. In 1969
and 1970 the Court decided two very similar civil cases which raised
collateral retroactivity questions. In Cipriano v. City of Houma 2 6 the
Court held that a Louisiana law giving only "property taxpayers" the
118. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
119. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Batson had established that a defendant in a state criminal trial
could establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment based on the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to strike members of the defendant's race from the jury. Id at 96-98.
120. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 316.
121. Id. at 322.
122. See id
123. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
124. 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
125. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310; Butler, 110 S.Ct. at 1216-17. Notwithstanding the Court's
asserted adoption of Justice Harlan's views, commentators have noted that the precise test
adopted by the Rehnquist Court in Teague and Butler differs both in theory and effect from
Justice Harlan's ideal. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1747-48 ("The conception of
legal newness implicit in Teague and its progeny is difficult to reconcile with the conception of
the judicial role embraced by Justice Harlan."); Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas,42 HAsTINGS L.J. 939, 990-91 (1991) (arguing that in Teague, and later in Butler, the Court adopted
Justice Harlan's proposals in name only and that the "new habeas" greatly differs from that
contemplated by Justice Harlan).
126. 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (per curiam).
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right to vote in elections called to approve the issuance of revenue bonds
127
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In a one paragraph discussion at the end of the opinion, the Court stated
that "[s]ignificant hardships would be imposed on cities, bond-holders,
and others connected with municipal utilities if our decision today were
given full retroactive effect."' 128 It therefore held that the decision would
apply only "where, under state law, the time for challenging the election
result ha[d] not expired."' 129 In City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,130 the
to elections auCourt reached an essentially identical result with regard
13 1
thorizing the issuance of general obligation bonds.
These two cases deserve comment, primarily because the Court has
relied heavily upon them in later decisions. 132 First, in both cases the
Court devoted only one paragraph to the retroactivity question; its analysis was neither exhaustive nor particularly illuminating.1 33 Second, it is
worth clarifying the result reached in Cipriano. There, the Court, in an
unfortunate choice of wording, stated that it would "apply [its] decision
in this case prospectively."' 34 In the very next sentence, however, the
Court made it clear that it was not really applying the decision prospectively, but was merely limiting its application-the new rule would apply
only to those challenges still subject to direct review; it would not apply
to collateral attacks.135 Thus, the result in Cipriano is directly analogous to that of Linkletter, in which the new rule was held to apply to all
convictions still subject to direct review, but not to those open only to
36
collateral attack.'
127. Id. at 702.
128. Id. at 706 (citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Chico County Drainage
Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1939); Great N. R.R. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co, 287
U.S. 358 (1932)).
129. Id.
130. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
131.

Id. at 214.

132. See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2338-39 (1990); id. at
2351-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. This raises the question whether these cases deserve the attention they still receive
today. For example, both Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion and Justice Stevens's dissent in
Smith devoted more space to the two cases than the Court had actually given to the retroactivity issue in the cases themselves. See Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 2338-39 (plurality opinion of
O'Connor, J.); id. at 2351-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
135.

Id. At least one commentator, focusing on the words used by the Court rather than

the facts behind them, has cited Cipriano as an example of pure prospective decisionmaking.
See Beytagh, supra note 13, at 1575-76 (1975). This interpretation cannot be squared with the
facts of the case. Indeed, Justice Harlan, concurring in United States v. Estate of Donnelly,
397 U.S. 286 (1970), cited Cipriano as supporting his proposal that new decisional rules should
always be applied to all conduct still subject to direct review. See id. at 296 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
136. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 137 decided during the same term
as Kolodziejski, is notable not for its holding, but rather for Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion. Concerned that the majority's opinion
"[might] point in the direction of a retroactivity quagmire in civil litigation not unlike that in which the Court has become ensnared in the criminal field," ' 13 8 Justice Harlan, analogizing from the criminal to the civil
arena, reiterated several of the points he had made in his Desist dissent:
The impulse to make a new decisional rule nonretroactive rests, in civil
cases at least, upon the same considerations that lie at the core of stare
decisis, namely to avoid jolting the expectations of parties to a transaction. Yet once the decision to abandon precedent is made, I see no
justification for applying principles determined to be wrong, be they
constitutional or otherwise, to litigants who are in or may still come to
court. The critical factor in determining when a new decisional rule
should be applied to a transaction consummated prior to the decision's
announcement is, in my view, the point at which the transaction has
acquired such a degree of finality that the rights of the parties should
be considered frozen. Just as in the criminal field the crucial moment
is, for most cases, the time when a conviction has become final, ... so
in the civil area that moment should be when the transaction is beyond
challenge either because the statute of limitations has run or the rights
of the parties have been fixed by litigation and have become resjudicata. Any uncertainty engendered by this approach should, I think, be
deemed part of the risks of life.139
Justice Harlan noted in conclusion that in the civil area the law of remedies provides courts with a measure of flexibility. Therefore, equitable
considerations, such as reliance, should not determine whether or not a
new rule be given retroactive effect, but may instead be taken into account in fashioning an appropriate remedy. 140
Despite Justice Harlan's warning, less than two years later the
Court did ensnare itself in a civil retroactivity quagmire with its decision
in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson. 14 1 Plaintiff Huson had suffered a back injury while working on an off-shore drilling rig located off the Gulf Coast
of Louisiana and owned and operated by Chevron. 142 He brought suit in
137.

397 U.S. 286 (1970).

138.

Id. at 295 (Harlan, J., concurring).

139. Id. at 295-96 (citation omitted). Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Smith, quoted this
exact passage. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 2350-51 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. at 296-97 (Harlan, J., concurring). Dissenting in Smith,
Justice Stevens emphasized this point. See Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 2355-56 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); ef Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1736-37 (proposing a general theory of "constitutional remedies").
141. 404 U.S. 97 (1971). Chevron Oil did not involve a constitutional issue, but instead
revolved around a tort law statute of limitations question. For this reason alone, the wisdom
of applying Chevron Oil in the context of tax refund cases is questionable. See infra Part
II.C.(2).
142. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 98.
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federal district court a little more than two years after the accident.
At the time the suit was initiated, a long line of federal court decisions
supported the application of the admiralty doctrine of equitable laches to
personal injury suits such as Huson's. 144 However, while the case was in
the discovery stage, the Court announced its decision in Rodrigue v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 14 5 holding that state tort law, not admiralty
law, governed suits such as Huson's. 146 Relying on Rodrigue, the district
court applied Louisiana's one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and granted summary judgment for Chevron. 147
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the new rule established by Rodrigue should be applied retroactively to bar Huson's claim.
The Court began its analysis of the issue by stating that "[i]n recent
years, the nonretroactive application of judicial decisions has been most
conspicuously considered in the area of the criminal process. But the
problem is by no means limited to that area." 148 After canvassing past
cases, the Court identified three factors bearing on the nonretroactivity
question. 149 Thus was born the three-prong Chevron Oil test.
First, the Court stated that the decision to be applied nonretroactively must have established a new principle of law, either by overruling
clear past precedent, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.1 50 Second, citing Linkletter, it
declared that a court must consider the history, purpose, and effect of the
new rule to determine if retroactive application would further or retard
the rule's operation. 151 Third, it asserted that a court must consider
whether retroactive application of the new rule would "produce substan152
tial inequitable results."
The Court next examined the facts in light of these three factors.
First, noting that Rodrigue had overruled a long line of Fifth Circuit
precedent, the Court concluded that the case had established a new principle of law. 153 Second, after finding that one of the primary purposes of
Rodrigue's new rule was to provide a remedy to injured employees, the
Court noted that applying the rule retroactively would contradict this
purpose by denying relief to Huson.15 4 Finally, stating that its decision
would "simply preserve [Huson's] right to a day in court," the Court

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id. at 99.
395 U.S. 352 (1969).
Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 99 (citing Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 366).
Id.
Id. at 105-06 (citations omitted).
Id. at 106.
Id.
Id. at 106-07 (citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965)).
Id. at 107 (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969)).
Id.
Id. at 107-08.
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concluded that, in contrast, retroactive application would "produce the
most 'substantial inequitable results.' "155 Therefore, the rule established
in Rodrique was given purely prospective effect, and Huson's claim
against Chevron was remanded to the trial court. 156 As embodied in
Chevron Oil, the Court's civil retroactivity doctrine would remain in the
shadows, while criminal retroactivity continued to change and provoke
controversy.
II.

Nonretroactivity in Constitutional Tax Refund Cases

For seventeen years Chevron Oil existed in relative obscurity, surfacing occasionally to wreak confusion in the lower courts, 157 but otherwise
evoking little interest. With its decisions in McKesson Corp. v. Division of
59
Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco,158 American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith,'
and James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,160 however, the Court has
brought civil retroactivity back into the limelight. This Part examines
the McKesson, Smith, and Beam decisions. The examination reveals serious flaws in the Court's current approach: McKesson, weakened by compromise, delivers much less than it seems to promise; Smith and Beam,
illustrative of deep divisions in the Court, promise only uncertainty.
A. McKesson: Fundamental Fairness and the Right to a Remedy
In McKesson, the Supreme Court addressed the remedial question
that is presented after a state tax is held unconstitutional as applied to
the taxpayer: to what relief is the taxpayer entitled? Not surprisingly,
the states have been extremely creative in finding ways to avoid paying
refunds of unconstitutional state taxes.' 6 1 In McKesson, however, a
unanimous Court seemingly set up a roadblock for states seeking to
avoid paying refunds, holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that states provide "meaningful backwardlooking relief" to remedy any such unconstitutional deprivations.162 McKesson's seemingly broad mandate has been hailed for its promise of fun155. Id. at 108 (quoting Cipriano,395 U.S. at 706).
156. Id. at 109. To be precise, only that portion of Rodrigue applying to the statute of
limitations would be made purely prospective; its other provisions, apparently, were to be
applied retroactively. Id. at 108 n.10.
157. See Corr,supra note 13, at 781-84; Delong, supra note 19, at 117-18.
158. 110 S.Ct. 2238 (1990).
159. 110 S. Ct. 2323 (1990).
160. 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
161. See generally Philip M. Tatarowicz, Right to a Refundfor UnconstitutionallyDiscriminatory State Taxes and Other ControversialState Tax Issues Under the Commerce Clause, 41
TAX LAW. 103 (1987) (discussing states' methods of avoiding payment of refunds after a tax
has been declared unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause).
162. McKesson, 110 S.Ct. at 2247.
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damental fairness to taxpayers. 163 The following sections examine
McKesson and show that for the time being, at least, this promise rings
hollow.
(1) The McKesson Decision
For several decades, Florida's liquor excise tax scheme, like that of
many other states, had favored in-state products over out-of-state products.1 64 While such discrimination against interstate commerce was
clearly forbidden under accepted interpretations of the Commerce
Clause,1 6 5 the states had long assumed that the Twenty-first Amendment
shielded their discriminatory tax schemes from the reach of the Commerce Clause.166 However, in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias167 the
United States Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the Twenty-first
Amendment does not protect such discriminatory tax schemes. 168 In
light of Bacchus, the Florida Legislature revised its excise tax scheme.
Instead of ending the discrimination, however, Florida made only cosmetic changes in the system, which still gave preferential treatment to in1 69

state products.

Under Florida law, a taxpayer has no right to a predeprivation remedy; any challenge to a taxing scheme must be made in the form of a
refund action after the tax has been paid. 170 Petitioner McKesson, whose
products did not qualify for preferential tax treatment, brought a refund
action in Florida state court. The Florida Supreme Court agreed with
McKesson that the taxing scheme was unconstitutional; however, it held
that McKesson was not entitled to retroactive relief and refused to order
163. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1829 ("[T]he great merit of McKesson lies in
its promise for the future."); Hellerstein, PreliminaryReflections, supra note 3, at 334.
164. McKesson, 110 S. Ct. at 2242-43.
165. The Commerce Clause provides that "the Congress shall have Power .... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
.. " U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. Professor Tribe notes that
Although the Constitution contains language explicitly limiting state interference
with foreign commerce, nowhere does it explicitly limit state interference with interstate commerce. All of the doctrine in this area is thus traceable to the Constitution's
negative implications; it is by interpreting "these great silences of the Constitution"
that the Supreme Court has limited the scope of what the states might do.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 403 (2d ed. 1988) (quoting H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949)) (emphasis in original) (footnotes
omitted).
166. Hellerstein, PreliminaryReflections, supra note 3, at 325.
167. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
168. Id. at 263.
169. McKesson, 110 S. Ct. at 2243. Specifically, the new statute deleted the express preferences for "Florida-grown" products, replacing them with preferential treatment of certain citrus, grape, and sugarcane products, all of which are commonly grown in Florida, but not most
other states. Id.
170. Id. at 2251.
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a refund.1 71 It based this decision on two grounds. First, it noted that
the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco had "collected the liquor tax in 'good faith reliance on a presumptively valid statute.' "172
Second, the court reasoned that, because McKesson probably had passed
the extra cost of the tax on to its customers, allowing a refund would give
McKesson a "windfall." 1 73 McKesson petitioned for writ of certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court and the Court granted the petition,
74
consolidating the case with Smith. 1
a. The Right to "Meaningful Backward Looking Relief"
The question before the Court1 75 was "whether prospective relief, by
itself, exhausts the requirements of federal law."17 6 The response was a
resounding no:
[I]f a State places a taxpayer under duress promptly to pay a tax when
due and relegates him to a post-payment refund action in which he can
challenge the tax's legality, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment obligates the State to provide meaningful177
backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation.
Thus the Court acknowledged the existence of a right-the Due Process
Clause protects taxpayers from unconstitutional exactions-and held out
the promise of a remedy should that right be violated.
In a footnote the Court distinguished the remedial question at issue
78
in McKesson from the retroactivity question confronted in Smith.1
Although the Court's footnote seems confusing, the reason that there
was no retroactivity issue in McKesson is simple: the Florida excise tax,
clearly unconstitutional in light of Bacchus, was enacted after the
Bacchus decision. 179 Thus, the Court did not have to address the ques80
tion whether Bacchus should be applied retroactively.1
171. Id at 2244.
172. Id. (quoting McKesson v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 524 So. 2d
1000, 1010 (1988)) (footnote omitted).
173. Id. (citing McKesson, 524 So. 2d at 1010).
174. Id. at 2244.
175. Before reaching the remedial question, the Court addressed Florida's jurisdictional
challenge. Florida had argued that the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution barred
the Court from exercising jurisdiction over McKesson's claim. Id. at 2244-45. This claim was
quickly rejected, as the Court cited a long line of cases supporting its exercise of appellate
jurisdiction over the final judgment of a state court involving an issue of federal law. Id. at
2245.
176. Id. at 2247.
177. Id.
178. Id. at n.15; see also American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 2332-33
(1990) (distinguishing McKesson).
179. McKesson, 110 S. Ct. at 2243.
180. The Court faced this very question during its next term in James B. Beam Distilling
Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991). See discussion infra Part II.D.
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The Court's analysis was based on a series of little-known cases dating from the early part of this century that had involved similar
claims.' 8' According to the "traditional" analysis developed in those
cases: "Because exaction of a tax constitutes a deprivation of property,
the State must provide procedural safeguards against unlawful 1exactions
82
in order to satisfy the commands of the Due Process Clause."
Next, the Court defined "meaningful backward-looking relief." It
prefaced its analysis by stating that "a State found to have imposed an
impermissibly discriminatory tax retains flexibility in responding to this
determination."'' 83 Thus, Florida could reformulate the contested tax as
it deemed appropriate so long as it treated McKesson and its in-state
competitors in a manner "consistent with the dictates of the Commerce
84
Clause."1
The Court then provided three specific examples of remedies that
would be appropriate. First, Florida could refund that portion of the tax
that was discriminatory; that is, the difference between what McKesson
actually paid and what it would have paid had it been taxed at the same
rate as its in-state competitors.18 5 Second, Florida could assess and collect additional taxes from McKesson's competitors, thus undoing its past
discrimination. 186 In this regard, the Court noted that the Constitution
imposes a limit on the retroactive assessment of taxes, and that such efforts "may not be perfectly successful."' 1 87 It concluded that "a goodfaith effort to administer and enforce such a retroactive assessment likely
would constitute adequate relief."' 88 Finally, Florida could implement
some combination of a refund and a retroactive assessment on favored
competitors so long as the result was a nondiscriminatory taxing
scheme.189
b. Florida's Equitable Arguments
The Florida Supreme Court had relied on two "equitable considerations" in refusing to grant McKesson retroactive relief.' 90 The United
States Supreme Court, however, made short shrift of these two conten181. McKesson, 110 S. Ct. at 2248-50 (citing Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennet, 284
U.S. 239 (1931); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930); Montana Nat'l Bank v. Yellowstone
County, 276 U.S. 499 (1928); Ward v. Love County Bd. of Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17 (1920);
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280 (1912)).
182. Id. at 2250 (footnote omitted).
183. Id at 2252.
184. Id.
185. Id
186. Id.
187. Id.at n.23.
188. Id. Thus, the Court provided a significant potential loophole for states hoping to
avoid the mandate of McKesson. See infra notes 196-198 and accompanying text.
189. McKesson, 110 S. Ct. at 2252.
190. Id. at 2254.
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tions. First, responding to the assertion that the discriminatory tax had
been implemented "in good faith reliance on a presumptively valid statute," 19 1 the Court noted that the tax was virtually identical to that struck
down in Bacchus and that Florida could "hardly claim surprise at the
192 It did recognize that, if justified, such
... invalidation of the scheme."
reliance interests required protection. However, it asserted that "[a]
State's freedom to impose various procedural requirements on actions for
relief sufficiently meets this concern with respect to fupostdeprivation
19 3
cases."
ture
The Florida Supreme Court also had claimed that to allow McKesson a refund would be to give it a windfall since it likely had passed the
cost of the tax on to its customers.1 94 After noting logical flaws in this
argument, the Court completely rejected this "pass-on" defense: "The
State cannot persuasively claim that 'equity' entitles it to retain tax moneys taken unlawfully from petitioner due to its pass-on of the tax where
the pass-on itself furthers the very competitive disadvantage constituting
the Commerce Clause violation that rendered the deprivation unlawful in
the first place." 19 5 In other words, the taxing scheme had been discriminatory precisely because it had forced out-of-state producers to charge
higher prices for its products, thereby giving in-state producers a competitive advantage; McKesson had received no windfall. Moreover, the
Court's rejection of these so-called "equitable considerations" suggests
that Florida, having implemented an unconstitutional exaction, was in
no position to argue the equities.
(2) A Stunning Victory?
Does McKesson truly represent a "stunning victory" for taxpayers? 196 The Court did unanimously declare that due process requires a
remedy for unconstitutional deprivations. Notwithstanding this declaration, however, three aspects of McKesson suggest that states still will be
able to avoid paying refunds in many situations. First, by defining
"meaningful backward-looking relief" broadly, the Court left states the
opportunity to turn "meaningful" into meaningless. Specifically, states
should pay particular attention to footnote twenty-three of the opinion,
in which the Court discusses "good faith effort[s]" to retroactively assess
additional taxes on those who benefitted from prior discriminatory
191. Id. (citing McKesson v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 524 So. 2d 1000,
1010 (1986)).
192. Id. at 2255.
193. Id. at 2254.
194. Id. at 2255 (citing McKesson v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 524 So.
2d 1000, 1010 (1986)).
195. Id. at 2256 (footnote omitted).
196. See Hellerstein, PreliminaryReflections, supra note 3, at 325, 333-36.
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schemes. 197 This is especially relevant in light of the fact that due process also limits the states' ability to assess taxes retroactively. 198 It seems
likely that states may try to meet McKesson's requirements by assessing
minimal retroactive taxes on those who had previously benefitted, on the
theory that this represents a "good faith" effort to follow the dictates of
due process. 199
Second, states certainly will note that McKesson encourages the implementation of various procedural requirements for tax refund actions.
Unfortunately, the Court did not set any clear constitutional parameters
for such procedural roadblocks. How strict can states be and still provide due process? Undoubtedly, this issue will be the subject of future
litigation, as taxpayers challenge extremely strict procedural restrictions
set up by the states in response to McKesson.
Finally, as Smith proves, the Court's retroactivity doctrine remains
a potent weapon for denying refunds in constitutional tax cases.2°° Cases
like McKesson, where the constitutional violation was so clear that no
nonretroactivity argument could credibly be made, may prove to be the
exception. As the next section shows, the Court's retroactivity doctrine,
and specifically the Chevron Oil test, poses significant problems for taxpayers seeking a refund of unconstitutionally exacted state taxes.
B. Smith: Nonretroactivity Strikes Back
In Smith the Court, faced with a choice of law rather than a remedies question, reached a remarkably different result from that reached in
McKesson. Whereas McKesson was unanimously decided, Smith produced no majority opinion, as the Justices split hopelessly over the retroactivity issue. The following sections provide an overview of Smith. Part
II.C. then analyzes the case in conjunction with McKesson. The analysis
reveals that the different approaches to constitutional tax refund questions that the two cases represent are irreconcilably contradictory, suggesting that McKesson represents less of a victory for the taxpayer than
the Court and commentators might have us believe.
197. McKesson, 110 S. Ct. at 2252 n.23.
198. In Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938), the Court held that a two-year period "approach[ed] or reach[ed] the limit of permissible retroactivity." Id. at 151.
199. On remand in McKesson the Florida Supreme Court was careful to note that such
retroactive assessments must comport with the requirements of due process. See Division of
Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco v. McKesson Corp., 574 So. 2d 114, 115 (Fla. 1991). Indeed,
two Justices of the Florida Supreme Court specifically mentioned footnote 23 of the McKesson
opinion in their separate concurrences. See id. at 117 (Overton, J., concurring); id. at 118
(Grimes, J., concurring).
200. See infra Part II.C. (criticizing application of retroactivity doctrine in constitutional
tax refund cases as inconsistent with McKesson).
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(1) Factualand ProceduralBackground

In 1983 out-of-state truckers challenged Arkansas's newly enacted
annual highway use ("HUE") tax2 01 in Arkansas state court, contending
that the tax discriminated against out-of-state truckers in violation of the
Commerce Clause. The taxpayers claimed that, as structured, the HUE
tax discriminated against interstate commerce by imposing greater permile costs2 on out-of-state truckers than those imposed on in-state
20
truckers.
The trial court rejected the taxpayers' challenge. 20 3 The Arkansas
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tax was constitutional under a
series of United States Supreme Court cases z2 4 dating back over three
decades.2 0 5 The taxpayers appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which held the case pending its decision in American Trucking Ass'ns v.
constitutional challenge to two
Scheiner,20 6 which involved a similar
20 7
Pennsylvania highway use taxes.
In Scheiner a five-four majority held that the Pennsylvania taxes at
issue discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, and remanded the case to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.2 0 8 Because the Court's resolution of Scheiner bore on the constitutionality of the Arkansas HUE tax, the Court also remanded Smith to
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of its decision in
the Arkansas
2 9
Scheiner. o
201. Arkansas Highway Use Equalization (HUE) Tax Act, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 27-35204, 27-35-205 (Michie 1987).
202. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2327 (1990).
203. Id at 2327-28.
204. These cases, known as the Aero-Mayflower line, had upheld against Commerce Clause
challenge imposition of similar flat highway use taxes. See Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice,
339 U.S. 542 (1950); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495
(1947); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 295 U.S. 285 (1935).
205. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Gray, 288 Ar. 488, 707 S.W.2d 759 (1986), aff'd sub
nom. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323 (1990).
206. 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
207. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2328.
208. Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 297-98. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Powell, dissented on the grounds of stare decisis and state reliance on the AeroMayflower line. Id. at 302-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia filed a separate dissent,
also joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, arguing that the Court's dormant commerce clause
doctrine is constitutionally unsound. Id. at 304-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2328. The taxpayers then sought to enjoin the state from collecting any further taxes, or alternatively, to order an escrow of the taxes pending reconsideration
of their constitutional claim. The Arkansas Supreme Court denied the taxpayers motion; but
on appeal, Justice Blackmun ordered the State to "escrow the HUE taxes to be collected until
a final decision on the merits in this case is reached." American Trucking Ass'ns v. Gray, 483
U.S. 1306, 1310 (1987) (in chambers), aff'd sub nom. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 110
S. Ct. 2323 (1990).
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Finally, on March 14, 1988, the Arkansas Supreme Court, reconsidering the case in light of Scheiner, held the HUE tax to be unconstitutional.2 10 The Arkansas court further held, however, that under Chevron
Oil,211 the Scheiner decision should not be given retroactive effect.2 12 After the taxpayers' petition for a rehearing was denied, they sought a writ
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. The Court granted the
the case with McKesson, which was decided on
petition, and consolidated
2 13
the same day.
(2) The Plurality Opinion
According to Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, the only question before the Court was: "Did the Arkansas Supreme Court apply
Chevron Oil correctly?" 2 14 In reaching this question, it noted that, while
Griffith v. Kentucky 2 15 recently had brought about substantial changes in
the Court's criminal retroactivity doctrine, "retroactivity of decisions in
the civil context 'continues to be governed by the standard announced in
[Chevron Oil].' "216
The plurality also took care to distinguish the retroactivity question
here at issue from the "distinct remedial question" at issue in McKesson.2 17 According to the Smith plurality, the question before the Court
was "whether there [has been] a constitutional violation in the first
place." 2 18 In other words, unless Scheiner was given retroactive effect,
there was no constitutional violation until the date of the decision, and
thus no remedy required under McKesson for any taxes levied before that
date.
Applying the three-prong Chevron Oil test, the plurality held that
Scheiner would not apply to taxation occurring before the date the rule
established in Scheiner was decided. 2 19 First, it addressed the question of
whether Scheiner had established a new principle of law: "We think it
obvious that Scheiner meets the first test of nonretroactivity." 220 Specifi210. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Gray, 295 Ark. 43, 45, 746 S.W.2d 377, 378 (1988),
aff'd sub nom. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323 (1990). Several months
earlier the Arkansas legislature, meeting in special session, had repealed the HUE tax, replacing it with a nondiscriminatory highway use tax. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2328.
211. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
212. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2329. The Arkansas court refused to order a refund for any taxes
paid prior to Justice Blackmun's escrow order. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 2331.
215. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
216. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2331 (citing Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322 n.8; United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 550 & n.12 (1982)).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 2333.
219. Id. at 2333-34,
220. Id. at 2331.
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447

cally, it found that Scheiner had overruled past precedent upon which
'22 1
"the State of Arkansas relied in enacting and assessing the HUE tax.
In a brief, four sentence discussion, the plurality next addressed the "purpose and effect" prong of the Chevron Oil test.222 According to Justice
O'Connor, the purpose to be furthered was the Commerce Clause's prohibition of state discrimination against interstate commerce. 22 3 By finding that Scheiner had established a new rule of law, the Court already
had determined that HTE was a legitimate taxing scheme up until
Scheiner was decided. Therefore, Justice O'Connor concluded, retroactive application of Scheiner would not serve the purpose of the ComClause to
merce Clause, since "it is not the purpose of the Commerce
'224
prevent legitimate state taxation of interstate commerce.
Finally, the plurality considered the equities of retroactive application of Scheiner. In this regard, it put great emphasis on the State's reliance upon past precedent, as well as the fiscal problems it might face if
required to tender a refund. 225 It then asserted conclusorily that "applying Scheiner retroactively would 'produce substantial inequitable
results.' ,,226
(3) The Dissenting Opinion

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, dissented, characterizing the plurality opinion as "nothing more
221. Id. at 2332. While the plurality's reading of Scheiner is not unreasonable, it is less
than "obvious" that the Aero Mayflower line was, in fact, overruled. See American Trucking
Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 296 (1987) (stating that the Aero Mayflower precedents are
still valid in certain situations). But see id. at 298 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court
today directly overrules the holdings of at least three cases [including] ... Aero Mayflower
.... "); see also infra notes 273-278 and accompanying text (discussing how this first prong of
the Chevron Oil test lends itself to result-oriented decisionmaking).
222. More precisely, the second prong requires that the court "'weigh the merits and
demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and
effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.'" Chevron Oil
Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971) (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629
(1965)).
223. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2332.
224. Id. A closer examination of the facts reveals that things are not nearly so clear as
Justice O'Connor would have us believe. See infra notes 279-285 and accompanying text (discussing flaws of Chevron Oil's second prong).
225. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2333. Interestingly, the plurality did not recognize any equities,
such as "fundamental fairness" weighing in the taxpayers' favor.
226. Id. at 2333 (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971)). The taxpayers did win one small victory. Some had paid HUE taxes for the post-Scheiner tax year
both before and after the date of the Scheiner decision. The Arkansas Supreme Court had held
that the State's collection of these taxes was constitutional up until the date of Justice Blackmun's escrow order. However, the plurality held that the Arkansas Supreme Court had misapplied Chevron Oil and that the taxpayers probably had a valid claim for all taxes that were to
be applied to the post-Scheiner tax year, no matter when paid. It therefore reversed and remanded with respect to this aspect of the state court's decision. Id. at 2335-36.
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than a misreading of.. . Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.' ' 227 Instead, the
dissent would have dealt with the case in the same manner as McKesson,
remanding to the state court to determine the appropriate backwardlooking relief.228 In support of this approach, Justice Stevens raised two
distinct arguments. First, echoing Justice Harlan's criticisms of nonretroactivity, he declared that "[flundamental notions of fairness and legal
process dictate that the same rules should be applied to all similar cases
on direct review. ' 229 Second, he suggested that the plurality's approach
wrongly tangled the two threads of retroactivity, asserting that Chevron
Oil merely "establish[ed] a remedial principle for the exercise of equitable
discretion by federal courts and not, as the plurality states,
a choice of
'230
law principle applicable to all cases on direct review.
In arguing for a per se rule of retroactivity with regard to conduct
still subject to direct review, the dissent was essentially proposing that
the recently established rule of Griffith v. Kentucky 23 1 be extended to the
civil area: "Griffith was a criminal case, but the force of its reasoning
cannot properly be so limited. ' 232 It then quoted at length from Justice
Harlan's concurrence in United States v. Estate of Donnelly,233 paying
particular attention to his assertion that the flexibility of the law of remedies allows consideration of equitable interests, such as reliance, in fashioning an appropriate remedy. 234 This idea, the dissent intimated, was
implicit in the McKesson holding and sufficient to ensure that the State's
235
reliance interests would be protected.
In addition, the dissent argued that the plurality's decision was not
faithful to precedent. In this regard, it cited Cipriano v. City of
Huoma 2 36 and Phoenix v. Kolodziejski 237 as standing for the proposition
that new decisional rules relating to the constitutionality of a state 23or8
local law should be applied retroactively to all civil cases not yet final.
The dissenters concluded this portion of their argument by declaring that
"[tihe evenhanded administration of justice requires that we give [the
taxpayers] the benefit of the same
decisional rule that we applied in favor
' '239
of the taxpayers in Scheiner.
227. Ia. at 2346 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 2355-56.
229. Id. at 2349.
230. Id. at 2353.
231. 479 U.S. 314 (1987). See supra notes 117-121 and accompanying text.
232. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2350 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
233. 397 U.S. 286 (1970).
234. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2350-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 2355-56.
236. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
237. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
238. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2351-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Cipriano,395 U.S. at 706;
Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. at 214).
239. Id. at 2352.
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The second part of the dissent's argument, that Chevron Oil merely
established a remedial principle and not a choice of law provision, was
based on "[c]lose examination of Chevron Oil and its progeny. '24° This
close examination began with Chevron Oil itself. The dissenters dismissed the plurality's interpretation of the case as being overbroad, instead characterizing the case as one involving "the application of a
statute of limitations, an area over which the federal courts historically
have asserted equitable discretion to craft rules of tolling, laches, and
waiver." 24 1 They then went on to fit the remainder of the Court's civil
retroactivity cases into "a similar mold," concluding that "these cases
Harlan explained, consideration
are all remedy cases in which, as Justice
'242
of reliance might be appropriate.
Justice O'Connor found the dissent's argument troublesome enough
to offer a response. First, she stated that the decision neither unfairly
favored the Scheiner litigants, nor unfairly disfavored the litigants currently before the Court.243 This assertion was based on the fact that in
Scheiner the Court had addressed only the question of the Pennsylvania
tax's constitutionality, and had faced no retroactivity issue comparable to
the one now before it.2 44 Since the two cases had resolved completely
different issues, reasoned Justice O'Connor, there was simply no basis for
the argument that the two cases treated similarly situated litigants
245
differently.
Second, the plurality asserted that the dissent's argument that new
decisions should be applied retroactively to civil cases which are pending
on direct review was "little more than a proposal that we sub silentio
overrule Chevron Oil."246 And indeed, the plurality's characterization is
correct. For if the Court were to adopt Justice Harlan's suggested rule, a
court faced with a factual situation similar to that of Chevron Oil, in
which plaintiff's claim was pending on direct review at the time of the
rule-changing decision, would have no choice but to apply the new rule
247
retroactively.
Next, the plurality disputed the dissent's contention that Chevron
Oil merely stated a remedial provision: "While application of the princi240. Id. at 2353.
241. Id at 2354.
242. Id. at 2354-55 (citations omitted).
243. Id. at 2336 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
244. Id. at 2337.
245. Id at 2336; see Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1768 n.207.
246. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2337.
247. The dissent's argument that Chevron Oil simply represents an unexceptional case of a
federal court exercising equitable discretion regarding application of a statute of limitations
sounds convincing, until one reads Chevron Oil. There, the Court made it clear that it was
dealing with a retroactivity question (citing, among other cases, Sunburst, Linkletter, Desist,
Mackey, and Cipriano) and not a simple equitable principle. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,
404 U.S. 97, 105-07 (1971).
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pies of retroactivity may have remedial effects, they are not themselves
remedial principles. '248 The plurality noted that commentators, federal
appellate courts, and state courts all had considered Chevron Oil as a
choice of law provision, not a remedial doctrine.2 49 And once again, the
plurality's characterization was correct. One need only look to footnote
eight of Griffith v. Kentucky 25 0 to see that in 1987, all four of the nowdissenting Justices had joined in an opinion which stated that "the area
of civil retroactivity ... continues to be governed by the standard announced in Chevron Oil. Co. v. Huson. '2 5 1 This footnote specifically cites
Chevron Oil as the standard for civil retroactivity, not for a mere remedial principle.
Finally, the plurality declined the dissent's invitation to extend Griffith, which had adopted Justice Harlan's proposals regarding criminal
retroactivity, to the civil sphere.2 52 It justified this decision with the
statement that "there are important distinctions between the retroactive
application of civil and criminal decisions that make the Griffith rationale
far less compelling in the civil sphere. ' 253 But this conclusory assertion
ignores the logic underlying Griffith. There, the Court quoted extensively from Justice Harlan's opinions and went on to adopt his proposed
reforms in the area of criminal retroactivity. 254 What the plurality in
Smith failed to acknowledge is that Justice Harlan recognized little conceptual difference between criminal and civil retroactivity.2 5 5 And if the
Griffith Court found Justice Harlan's arguments so compelling, why
should it not adopt his proposal to the fullest extent possible? The plurality simply did not admit that its decision might be inconsistent with
Griffith.25 6 Nor did it need do so to meet the dissent's argument, which
never proposed that Justice Harlan's approach be adopted by extending
Griffith to civil cases. Instead, the dissent tried to reconcile two essentially irreconcilable concepts: it argued that Chevron Oil can coexist with
a doctrine that applies new rules retroactively to all conduct still subject
to direct review.2 57 By mischaracterizing Chevron Oil as a mere remedial
principle, the dissent detracted from its strongest argument-namely,
248.

Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2340.

249. Id.
250. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
251. Id. at 322 n.8 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 563
(1982)).
252.
253.

Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2341-43.
Id. at 2341.

254. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 321-23 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 548
(1982); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
255. See United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 295-96 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
256. See Hellerstein, Preliminary Reflections, supra note 3, at 332 ("[a]s for Justice
Harlan's views, the short answer was that the Court had never adopted them").
257. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2354-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that nonretroactive decisionmaking is inconsistent with basic norms of
constitutional adjudication.
(4) The Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion shows that Justice Harlan was
right when he asserted that the Court's nonretroactivity doctrine exists
for all the wrong reasons.25 8 At the same time, the concurrence is notable for being the most straightforward of the three opinions filed in
Smith.
Justice Scalia candidly admitted that he "share[s] Justice Stevens'
perception that prospective decisionmaking is incompatible with the judicial role, which is to say what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall
be."'25 9 He then went on to give an analysis of Smith that recalls Blackstone's declaratory theory:
To hold a governmental act to be unconstitutional is not to announce
that we forbid it, but that the Constitution forbids it ....

[T]he ques-

tion is not whether some decision of ours "applies" in the way that a
law applies; the question is whether the Constitution, as interpreted in
that decision, invalidates the statute ....

Either enforcement of the

statute at issue in Scheiner... was unconstitutional, or it was not; if it
was, then so is enforcement of all identical statutes in other States,
whether occurring before or after our decision .... 260
Like Blackstone, Scalia focuses on what law ought to be; constitutional questions have right answers and previous "wrong" interpretations
should be a nullity. Despite his forceful criticism of nonretroactivity,
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment because of his belief that the
Court's dormant commerce clause doctrine, 26 1 on which the Scheiner
holding was based, is "arbitrary, conclusory, and irreconcilable with the
constitutional text. '262 In other words, he joined the plurality in order to
limit the effect of a decision with which he disagreed. The phenomenon
of Justices using nonretroactivity to limit distasteful rules was one of the
evils cited by Justice Harlan twenty-one years earlier in Mackey. 263 In258. See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 676 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); supra text accompanying note 106.
259. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2343 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
260. Id. (emphasis in original)
261. See supra note 165.
262. Id. at 2344 (quoting DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 234 (1985)); see also Walter Hellerstein,
Justice Scalia and the Commerce Clause: Reflections of a State Tax Lawyer, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1763 (1991) ("Being asked to examine Justice Scalia's views on the Supreme Court's
dormant commerce clause jurisprudence is like being asked to examine the National Rifle
Association's views on gun control.")
263. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting); supra text accompanying note 107.
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deed, Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith brings to mind once again Justice
Harlan's declaration that retroactivity must be rethought.
C. Fundamental Fairness and Nonretroactivity
As the Court acknowledged in Griffith, retroactivity raises serious
264
questions regarding the Court's role as constitutional adjudicator.
Smith clearly illustrates how well founded those concerns are. A close
examination of Smith reveals that the doctrine's application to constitutional tax refund cases, both in theory and as embodied in Chevron Oil,
simply cannot be squared with norms of principled constitutional decisionmaking. Nor can it be squared with McKesson's broad language;
Smith illustrates how hollow "meaningful backward-looking relief" truly
is.
(1) Nonretroactivity in Constitutional Tax Refund Cases
Justice Harlan's criticisms of nonretroactivity have been chronicled
elsewhere in this Note.265 Nevertheless, they bear repeating, especially in
light of Smith.
First, Justice Harlan was concerned that the Court's retroactivity
doctrine encouraged unprincipled decisionmaking. 266 The doctrine, he
noted, had developed as an adjunct to the Court's revolutionary decisions
in the area of criminal procedure; some Justices used nonretroactivity to
limit the effect of decisions with which they disagreed, while others used
it as a means of implementing changes which could not otherwise be
267
practically effected.
The result in Smith illustrates the accuracy of this criticism. Justice
O'Connor, the author of the plurality opinion, had authored one of the
two dissents in Scheiner. Justice Scalia, author of the other Scheiner dissent, concurred in the result reached by the Smith plurality, candidly
admitting that his reason for doing so was his belief that Scheiner was
unsound. 268 And Chief Justice Rehnquist, who had joined in both
Scheiner dissents, joined the plurality in Smith. These facts suggest that
at least three of the Justices who voted to deny the taxpayers' claim for
retroactive relief were motivated by a desire to limit Scheiner as much as
269
possible.
264. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-24 (1987).
265. See supra notes 103-114 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
267. See id.
268. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2345 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Powell, the fourth Scheiner dissenter, was no longer on the Court when Smith
was decided. Justice Kennedy, who replaced Justice Powell, joined the plurality opinion.
269. Justice White was the sole member of the Scheiner majority to join the Smith plurality. Since he authored neither opinion, any theory regarding his switch of positions would be
purely conjectural.
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Justice Harlan also criticized nonretroactive decisionmaking as being inconsistent with the Court's constitutional mandate to "adjudicate
cases and controversies. ' 270 Justice Scalia also found this type of decisionmaking troubling, agreeing with Justice Harlan that it is not adjudication but legislation by judicial decision. 27 1
In this regard, it is worth noting the historical context in which Justice Harlan's criticisms were made. The Warren Court's extensive reforms of the law of constitutional criminal procedure were highly
controversial. At times, it may have appeared that the Court was acting
more like a legislature than a judicial body, using inappropriate cases as
vehicles for the pronouncement of far-reaching new rules. Against this
background, it should not be surprising that Justice Harlan, and others
2 72
as well, were troubled by nonretroactivity.
The debate in Smith over civil retroactivity in a sense echoes the
controversy that attended the Warren Court's landmark constitutional
criminal procedure decisions three decades earlier. Like the Warren
Court before, the Rehnquist Court has evidenced a willingness to "make
law." Today, as then, this approach to constitutional adjudication makes
some uneasy. 273
(2) Chevron Oil and Constitutional Tax Refund Cases
In addition to bearing out Justice Harlan's criticism of nonretroactivity, Smith shows that the Chevron Oil test is of little value in resolving
the issues raised in constitutional tax refund cases. This is probably attributable to the fact that the test was designed to deal with a completely
different question from that faced in cases such as Smith. What seemed
appropriate when applied to a statute of limitations question in a personal injury lawsuit has proven highly inappropriate when used to determine whether taxpayers are entitled to retroactive relief from an
unconstitutional state tax. In the context of these latter cases, each
prong of the Chevron Oil test, as well as the ultimate result, is seriously
flawed.
The first prong of Chevron Oil requires, as a threshold requirement,
a finding that the decision to be applied nonretroactively established a
270.

Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 678 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dis-

senting); see supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
271. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2343 (Scalia, J., concurring).
272. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1739 ("If the non-retroactivity of the Warren
Court's criminal procedure decisions attracted criticism for being unduly legislative, so did its
substantive holdings."); Schwartz, supra note 13, at 767 ("Johnson v. New Jersey seems to be
an intensely practical decision by a Court which was attempting to forestall an overly-hostile
public reaction to Miranda .
").
273. Beam provides further insights into the Justices divergent conceptions of the Court's
role as constitutional arbiter. See infra Part II.D.
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new principle of law. 274 While this is never an easy question to answer
with a simple yes or no, it is particularly problematic in the field of state
taxation. The past decade and a half has seen an outpouring of signifi-

cant constitutional decisions in this area. 275 Several cases have brought

into question the continued validity of earlier constitutional decisionsare now subtaxing schemes that have long been thought constitutional
276
uncertain.
outcome
eventual
the
with
attack
to
ject
Given these circumstances, the first prong of the Chevron Oil test
seems almost absurdly simplistic. Several of the Court's decisions that
have held a state tax unconstitutional, including Scheiner, have been
foreshadowed to some degree. 277 But Chevron Oil makes no mention of
degrees of foreshadowing; instead, it requires a bright line be drawn, and
gives virtually no guidance as to where to draw it. How foreseeable2 78
must a new rule be or not be to truly be a new rule? That question
Chevron Oil leaves to the courts' discretion.
Not surprisingly, the vagueness of this threshold question encourages abuse. Because it is so hard to pin down exactly what a new principle of law is, it is not hard to twist the test to reach the desired result.
That is, a court wishing to limit the effects of a decision it thinks unsound
can simply say "new principle of law," and move on to prongs two and
three. And even where courts act completely in good faith, the lack of
practically guarantees inconsiscertainty inherent in this determination 279
tent results, court to court, case to case.
274. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 108 (1971). The Court definitively established that the first prong of Chevron Oil is a threshold question on the last day of its 1990
term. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 110 S. Ct. 3202, 3204 (1990). Before Ashland Oil there
had been much uncertainty over this question. See generally DeLong, supra note 19.
275. Hellerstein, State Taxation, supra note 9, at 223, 224 & n.5.
276. In particular, two Supreme Court decisions involving the dormant Commerce Clause
have sparked much litigation and uncertainty. With its 1977 decision in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), the Court "necessarily called into question the
future vitality of earlier cases." American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 295
(1987). The second case, Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159
(1983) has placed many other state taxing schemes "under a constitutional cloud." Walter
Hellerstein, Is "InternalConsistency" Foolish?. Reflections on an Emerging Commerce Clause
Restraint on State Taxation, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 138, 148 (1988). See also supra note 10 (discussing pending challenges to several state taxing schemes).
277. See Ashland Oil, 110 S. Ct. at 3204 (holding that although Armco v. Hardesty, 467
U.S. 638 (1984), had extended reach of dormant Commerce Clause, it had not established a
new rule of law and thus should be applied retroactively); American Trucking Ass'ns v.
Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 286, 295 (1987) (noting that its decision in Complete Auto Transit v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), had called into question many discriminatory state taxing
schemes, including the one at issue in Scheiner).
278. The first prong of the Chevron Oil test asks whether the decision either overruled
clear past precedent or decided an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly
foreshadowed. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106.
279. Two recent Supreme Court cases provide evidence that this standard is too vague to
be applied consistently. In Ashland Oil, the Court interpreted the first prong of Chevron Oil
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Nor does the second prong of the Chevron Oil test, which focuses on
the purpose of the new rule, 2 0 add much to the inquiry in constitutional
tax refund cases. The purpose element of the Court's retroactivity doctrine is a direct descendant of Linkletter. There, the Court reasoned that
the purpose of the exclusionary rule, which is to deter illegal searches,
28 1
would not be furthered by retroactive application of Mapp v. Ohio.
While inquiring into the purpose of the Mapp rule made perfect sense in
light of those circumstances, transferring the purpose test to a case like
Smith makes little sense at all.
The biggest problem with analogizing from Linkletter to Smith is
that there is no comparably explicit purpose to the new rule established
by Scheiner. What exactly is the purpose of declaring unconstitutional a
state tax that discriminates against interstate commerce?28 2 The Smith
plurality did not provide a clear answer, simply asserting that "[i]t is
equally clear to us... that the purpose of the Commerce Clause does not
dictate retroactive application of Scheiner . . . . 283
In response to the taxpayers' argument that the purpose to be served
by retroactive application of Scheiner was the prevention of future discrimination against interstate commerce by the states, the plurality resorted to circular reasoning. Having already established that Scheiner
had created an unforeseeable, new principle of law, Justice O'Connor declared that "it is not the purpose of the Commerce Clause to prevent
legitimate state taxation of interstate commerce. ' 28 4 In other words,
since the threshold question had been satisfied, the state's actions before
the decision establishing the new rule were per se legitimate, and retroactive application would serve no purpose at all.
This stretch of logiC2s5 uncovers two inherent flaws in applying the
purpose test to cases like Smith. First, for a court even to reach the
quite narrowly. See Ashland Oil, 110 S. Ct. at 3204 (holding that merely extending a legal
doctrine beyond its original context does not establish a new principle of law). By contrast, the
Smith Court interpreted Chevron Oil's first prong much more broadly. See supra notes 219220 and accompanying text.
280. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106-07; see supra note 150 and accompanying text.
281. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965); supra notes 74-75 and accompanying
text.
282. The problem is not limited to Commerce Clause questions. It applies equally to taxes
that violate the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. The values that underlie the Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause are somewhat amorphous; to attribute one overriding "purpose" to any one of these concepts is to oversimplify
complex issues.
283. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2332 (1990).
284.

Id.

285. Fallon and Meltzer provide a hypothetical that illustrates the flaws in Justice
O'Connor's analysis:
[I]magine that a taxpayer had failed to pay highway use taxes in 1985, and that the
state promptly commenced a civil action to collect the unpaid taxes and a separate
criminal action for failure to pay. Imagine further that the state obtained a civil
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second prong, the threshold question must already have been satisfied.
This may taint the whole purpose analysis, as it did in Smith. Second,
the purpose test is so malleable that in most such situations it has little or
no objective value. Unless there is a purpose as clear as that presented in
Linkletter, which will not often be the case, the court can focus on
whatever purpose leads to the desired result. In Smith, for example, the
plurality did not effectively counter the taxpayers' argument that
Scheiner's purpose was to prevent state discrimination against interstate
commerce. Nor did it even address the possibility that Scheiner's purpose was to provide a remedy for victims of unconstitutional state action.
Instead, after a four sentence discussion, the plurality summarily dismissed the possibility that retroactive application of Scheiner would serve
any purpose at all. 28 6 Smith demonstrates how lacking in substance the
second prong of Chevron Oil is. So vague that it provides no help in
resolving the conflict presented in a case such as Smith, this malleable
standard serves no legitimate purpose.
The third prong of the Chevron Oil test requires that the court consider whether retroactive application of the new rule would bring about
an inequitable result.2 87 Although it conceivably may have had some
limited value in earlier cases,2 88 this standard is so imprecise as to be
almost meaningless in the context of a constitutional tax refund case.
The reality is that in such cases the same two competing interests will
always be at issue: on the one hand, the state will argue that it relied on a
presumptively valid taxing scheme and cannot now afford to give a refund, while the taxpayer will argue that fundamental fairness requires an
award of meaningful backward-looking relief. Chevron Oil's simple ineqjudgment in the one case and a criminal conviction in the other, and that both cases
were pending on appeal when Scheiner came down in 1987. According to Justice
O'Connor, the civil judgment would not need to be reversed: the tax was constitutional until the Court made new law in 1987, and tax liability for 1985 depends on
the law as of 1985. The criminal conviction, however, could not stand: under Griffith v. Kentucky, the constitutional law applicable to a criminal case not yet "final" is
the law as presently interpreted-under which the tax statute would be unconstitu-

tional. If retroactivity is viewed as involving what the law was in 1985, this disparity
makes no sense; the fiat tax cannot have been constitutional in 1985 for civil matters
but not for criminal ones.
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1767-68 (footnotes omitted).
286. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2332; see supra notes 221-223 and accompanying text.
287. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971); see supra text accompanying note
151.
288. For example, in Chevron Oil itself, retroactive application of the new rule would have
deprived plaintiff, who had relied in good faith on the old rule, of any opportunity to recover
for his allegedly serious injury. By holding that the new rule would not apply retroactively,
the Court was merely preserving plaintiff's right to a day in court; Chevron still would have
the opportunity to defend on the issue of liability. See Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 108. Intuitively, this seems the equitable result.
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uitable result inquiry provides little guidance to a court trying to balance
these two legitimate competing interests.
Instead, this vague standard invites a court to focus on whatever
inequity leads to the desired result. In Smith the Court discussed at
length the hardships that retroactive application of Scheiner would have
caused the State of Arkansas, 289 concluding that "[a] careful consideration of the equities persuades us that Scheiner should not apply retroactively."' 290 This "careful consideration," however, was strikingly onesided: not one equity weighing in the taxpayers' favor was cited. At a
minimum, considerations of fundamental fairness to the taxpayer, who
has been subjected to an unconstitutional levy, should have been considered. But because of the vagueness of the standard, no such meaningful
analytical balancing of the equities was required.
Not only are all three prongs of Chevron Oil fundamentally flawed,
but the all-or-nothing result that application of the test inevitably brings
about will often be inappropriate in light of the true equities of the situation. Each prong of the test may be satisfied by the barest of margins,
and yet no matter how compelling the taxpayers' case, there will be no
retroactive relief. This result is particularly unsatisfying in view of the
artificiality of Chevron Oil's threshold question. That is, the evidence
may indicate that the "new rule" became foreseeable at some point in
time well in advance of the decision that actually established it. But the
threshold question requires that a bright line be drawn; and once a court
has found that there was a new principle of law, assuming the other two
prongs are satisfied, then there will be no remedy for any taxes levied
before the date the new rule was officially recognized. Thus, even though
the new rule might have been reasonably foreseeable several years before
a court finally declared it, the rule would not be made retroactive for that
interim period.
This result is made especially harsh by the fact that the Eleventh
Amendment requires that an out-of-state taxpayer challenging a state tax
obtain a final judgment from the taxing state's highest court before the
United States Supreme Court may exercise appellate review. 29 1 Thus,
the state, in all likelihood, will be able to collect taxes while the case
works its way through the state courts, secure in the knowledge that it
may not be required to refund any taxes levied before the date the United
States Supreme Court finally decides the case. In the final analysis, Chevron Oil works a harsh and inequitable result; one that cannot be reconciled with McKesson's promise of fundamental fairness.
289. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2332-34.
290. Id. at 2333.
291. See supra note 175.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43

(3) What Smith Says About McKesson

It is tempting to focus on the fact that McKesson was decided unanimously and conclude that the decision strongly favors fundamental fairness to the taxpayer.2 92 But this appearance of solidarity deceives. As
Smith demonstrates, the thread that held the Court together in McKesson

was fragile indeed. 293 Thus, it is appropriate to ask again whether McKesson really represents much of a victory for the taxpayer. The answer
is disappointing: McKesson's promise is qualified by the Court's apparent willingness to decide cases nonretroactively and by its ambiguously
broad definition of backward-looking relief. Considered in conjunction,
Smith and McKesson show that application of Chevron Oil in constitu-

tional tax refund cases leads to illogic and uncertainty.
D.

Curiouser and Curiouser:2 94 James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia

In its 1991 term the Supreme Court faced a virtual replay of the
drama played out in Smith. Like Smith, James B. Beam DistillingCo. v.
Georgia295 involved a retroactivity issue in the context of a Commerce
Clause challenge to a state taxing scheme. Even more than Smith, Beam
illustrates the sharp disagreement among the Justices regarding nonretroactivity: the case sparked five separate opinions, no one of which was
joined by more than three members of the Court.2 96 Because the decision
is so badly fragmented, Beam confuses at least as much as it clarifies.
But it does provide fascinating insights into the problems that lie at the
292. Cf Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1824, 1828-29 (lauding McKesson as one of
the "rare" cases to recognize a constitutional right to a compensatory remedy); Hellerstein,
PreliminaryReflections, supra note 3, at 325 (declaring that "[i]n McKesson the Court handed
the taxpayers a stunning victory").
293. See McKesson v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 110 S. Ct. 2238, 2247
n.15 (1990) (distinguishing Smith and foreshadowing the controversy that case reflects).
294. "Curiouser and curiouser!" cried Alice (she was so much surprised, that for the
moment she quite forgot how to speak good English); "now I'm opening out like the
largest telescope that ever was! Good-bye, feet!" (for when she looked down at her
feet, they seemed to be almost out of sight, they were getting so far off). "Oh my
poor little feet, I wonder who will put on your shoes and stockings for you now,
dears? I'm sure I shan't be able! I shall be a great deal too far off to trouble myself
about you: you must manage the best way you can .... "
LEwis CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND ch. 2 (1865).
295. 111 S.Ct. 2439 (1991).
296. Justice Souter wrote the plurality opinion in which Justice Stevens joined. Id. at 2441
(discussed infra notes 306-325 and accompanying text). Justice White, concurring in the judgment, wrote a separate opinion. Id at 2448 (discussed infra note 319). Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justices Scalia and Marshall, also concurred in the judgment. Id. at 2449 (discussed
infra notes 334-337 and accompanying text). Justice Scalia also wrote a separate concurring
opinion, in which Justices Blackmun and Marshall joined. Id. at 2450 (discussed infra notes
327-333 and accompanying text). Finally, Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Kennedy, dissented. Iae at 2451 (discussed infra notes 340-352 and accompanying
text).
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heart of the nonretroactivity question and illuminates the divergent views
of the individual Justices regarding the proper role of the Court as final
arbiter of the Constitution. The following sections summarize Beam,
paying particular attention to the Justices' varying approaches to retroactivity. This sets the stage for Part III, which proposes a solution to the
dilemma posed.
(1) Factualand ProceduralBackground
The question presented in Beam was whether the rule established in
Bacchus Imports,Ltd. v. Dias2 97 would be applied retroactively. 29 Georgia long had imposed a discriminatory excise tax on imported alcohol
and distilled spirits.2 99 In its 1984 decision in Bacchus, the Supreme
Court held that an essentially identical Hawaiian taxing scheme violated
the Commerce Clause. 30 In so holding, the Court rejected the long-accepted proposition that the Twenty-first Amendment to the United
States Constitution removes state regulation
of alcoholic beverages from
301
the ambit of the Commerce Clause.
Following the Court's decision in Bacchus, the James B. Beam Distilling Company ("James Beam") sought a refund of all monies paid
under the now unconstitutional Georgia tax.3 0 2 The state trial court,
while agreeing that the tax violated the Commerce Clause, held that
under Chevron Oil, Bacchus should not be given retroactive effect, and
thus James Beam was not entitled to a refund of any monies paid prior to
the date Bacchus was decided. 30 3 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.
It concluded that Bacchus had created a new rule of law by overruling
past Georgia precedent, and that to give it retroactive effect would have
frustrated the State's reliance interests and led to an unjust result. 3°4 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the retroactivity issue
30 5
one week after handing down its decisions in McKesson and Smith.
297. 468 U.S. 263 (1984). Interestingly, it was the Court's ruling in Bacchus that lay behind the refund claim in McKesson. See McKesson, 110 S. Ct. at 2243; supra notes 163-168
and accompanying text.
298. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2441.
299. Id. at 2442.
300. Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 273.
301. Id. at 274-76; see Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that
prior to Bacchus, "an uninterrupted line of authority from this Court held that States need not
meet the strictures of the so-called 'dormant' or 'negative' Commerce Clause when regulating
sales and importation of liquor within the State").
302. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2442. The precise amount demanded by James Beam was $2.4
million. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. (citing James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 259 Ga. 363, 365, 382 S.E.2d 95,
96 (1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 2616 (1990)).
305. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 110 S. Ct. 2616 (1990).
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(2) The Plurality Opinion
Justice Souter, author of the plurality opinion (in which only Justice
Stevens joined), began generally by reviewing nonretroactivity. 30 6 He
then turned to the question whether Bacchus should be given retroactive
effect. He noted that in Bacchus, after striking down the Hawaiian tax,
the Court remanded the case to the Hawaiian courts for determination of
the appropriate remedy without making any mention of Chevron Oil or
retroactivity. 307 This fact led Justice Souter to conclude that "[b]ecause
the Court in Bacchus remanded the case solely for consideration [of remedial issues], it thus should be read as having retroactively applied the
rule there decided. '30 8 Not only does this disposition distinguish Beam
from Smith, 30 9 but it allowed Justice Souter to rephrase the question
before the Court so that it practically answered itself: "the question is
whether it is error to refuse to apply a rule of federal law retroactively
done so. ''310 The answer,
after the case announcing the rule has already
3 11
Justice Souter predictably concluded, is yes.
By framing the issue in this manner, Justice Souter managed to
avoid any sort of Chevron Oil analysis. 31 2 But this did not stop him from
pursuing a further discussion of nonretroactivity. He began by stating
that "Griffith cannot be confined to the criminal law," asserting that, if
anything, the rationale of Griffith applies with even more force in the
civil sphere than it does in the criminal context.3 13 In particular, Justice
Souter's discussion focused on two themes on which nonretroactivity's
critics long have focused: fairness to litigants and adherence to the principle of stare decisis. 31 4 This discussion, while saying little that has not
already been said regarding nonretroactivity, is notable for what it leads
to: the express rejection of selective prospectivity. "Once retroactive apit is chosen for all others
plication is chosen for any assertedly new rule,
'31 5

who might seek its prospective application.

306. See Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2443-45. Surveying the three retroactive methods, Justice
Souter concludes that while full retroactivity is "overwhelmingly the norm," pure prospectivity "tends to relax the force of precedent." Id. at 2443. Selective prospectivity, he asserts,
"appears never to have been endorsed in the civil context." Id. at 2445 (citing American
Trucking Asss'ns v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 2323 (1990)).
307. Id. at 2445 (citing Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1984)).
308. Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
309. In Smith the plurality specifically argued that since the ScheinerCourt had remanded
the case to the state court for determination of both retroactivity and remedial questions, it had
not applied its new rule retroactively. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2336-37 (plurality opinion of
O'Connor, J.).
310. Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2446.
311. Id.
312. See id. at 2447 (noting irrelevance of Chevron Oil to case at hand).
313. Id. at 2446.
314. Id. at 2446-48.
315. Id. at 2447-48.
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316
Having asserted that Chevron Oil was inapplicable to the case,
Justice Souter acknowledged that this later aspect of his Beam opinion
"does limit the possible applications of the Chevron Oil analysis. ' 317 To
what extent Justice Souter would like to limit Chevron Oil is unclear,
however. Though he "refuse[d] to speculate as to the bounds or propriety of pure prospectivity, '3 18 Justice Souter's plurality opinion suggested
31 9
a willingness to limit or even eliminate the use of pure prospectivity.
On the whole, the plurality opinion seems a curious compromise. In

criticizing selective prospectivity, it spoke of lofty goals like fairness and

at least superficially paid homage to stare decisis. 320 Yet Justice Souter
stopped halfway, refusing to "speculate" regarding the propriety of pure
prospectivity, and thus declining to accept Justices Blackmun and
Scalia's invitation to outlaw all prospective decisionmaking. 321 At the
same time, the focus on fairness and stare decisis as militating against
prospectivity clearly distances the plurality from the positivist approach
taken by Justice O'Connor in her dissent. 322 Indeed, Justice Souter's
"middle-ground" result appears all the more unusual in light of the explanations offered in its support.
In criticizing selective prospectivity, Justice Souter essentially based
his argument on Justice Harlan's familiar analysis. 3 23 In rejecting only
selective prospectivity, however, he made a distinction that Justice
Harlan never did. While Justice Harlan certainly criticized selective
316. See id. at 2445, 2446.
317. Id. at 2447. In light of this limitation of Chevron Oil, it appears that the Virginia
Supreme Court reached the wrong result by refusing to give Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803
(1989) retroactive effect. See Harper v. Virginia, 1991 Va. Lexis 146, at *7 (Nov. 8, 1991) (on
remand) (discussed supra note 10). A straightforward reading of Davis suggests that the taxpayer there was given the benefit of the new rule, see Davis, 489 U.S. at 817 (citing Iowa Des
Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931)), and thus that under Beam, all other
litigants must receive its benefit as well.
318. Id. at 2448.
319. This interpretation of Justice Souter's refusal to speculate is supported by Justice
White's concurrence on broader grounds. See id. at 2448 (White, J., concurring) (asserting
that the plurality's result "would be true under any one of [three] suppositions"). Justice
White apparently reads into the plurality opinion a threat to the continued viability of Chevron
Oil, thus the separate concurrence. In response to the plurality's apparent invitation to further
limit pure prospectivity, he asserts his unwillingness to "retreat from those opinions filed in
this Court which I wrote or joined holding or recognizing that in proper cases a new rule
announced by the Court will not be applied retroactively, even to the parties before the Court."
Id. at 2449.
320. Id. at 2446-48.
321. See infra notes 325-326, 332-335 and accompanying text.
322. See infra text accompanying notes 344-346.
323. See, e.g., Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2443 (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting)); id at 2444 (citing Desist v. United States, 394
U.S. 244, 258-59 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); id. at 2446 (citing United States v. Estate of
Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 296 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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prospectivity, 324 his criticisms were not limited to that one method, but
instead encompassed the Court's entire retroactivity doctrine. 325 Once
the Harlan analysis has been accepted, there is no basis for distinguishing
between the two types of prospective decisionmaking; each is equally unacceptable. Therefore, it makes little sense for Justice Souter to adopt
Justice Harlan's criticisms as his own, emphasize Griffith's relevance to
civil cases, and at the same time, refuse to speculate on the propriety of
pure prospectivity.
Considering the divisions among the Justices regarding civil retroactivity, Justice Souter may deserve more credit for marshalling six votes
than this analysis has given him. Nevertheless, Justice Souter's refusal to
speculate seems destined to spark future speculation, for his opinion
leaves at least as many questions open as it answers.
(3) The ConcurringOpinions
While Justice White, author of a short concurring opinion, apparently believed that Justice Souter's opinion went too far towards limiting
prospective decisionmaking, 326 Justices Blackmun, Scalia, and Marshall
would go farther still and explicitly overrule Chevron Oil. Though
clearly agreeing on this goal, Justices Blackmun and Scalia differed
slightly on its justification, as evidenced by the fact that each filed a separate concurring opinion. Apparently, however, their differences are not
great; each joined the other's opinion, and Justice Marshall joined both.
Justice Scalia's analysis focused on the Constitutional text and, specifically, on the Constitution's allocation of judicial and legislative powers. The judicial power, as seen by Scalia, is "the power 'to say what the
law is,' . . . rather than decreeing what it is today changed to or what it
will tomorrow be."' 327 He protested that by deciding cases prospectively,
and pure prosthe Court acts like a legislature. Therefore, both selective
328
pectivity are beyond the Court's constitutional power.
324. In this vein is his often-cited criticism of the Court's practice of "fishing one case
from the stream and then permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected... ." Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
325. See, e.g., id. at 681 (describing the Court's "ambulatory retroactivity doctrine" as "an
inexplicable and unjustifiable departure from the basic principle upon which rests the institution of judicial review").
326. See supra note 318.
327. Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2451 (emphasis in original) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
328. Id. In Smith, however, Justice Scalia apparently did not find it beyond the Court's
power to give Scheiner prospective effect. See supra text accompanying notes 257-262.
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For Justice Scalia, the concerns of equity and judicial integrity that
animate Justice Harlan's (and Justice Blackmun's) 32 9 criticism of nonretroactivity are irrelevant:
I would no more say that what [Justice Souter] calls 'selective prospectivity' is impermissible because it produces inequitable results than I
would say that the coercion of confessions is impermissible for that
reason. I believe that the one, like the other, is impermissible simply
because it is not allowed by the Constitution. Deciding between a conan unconstitutional one does not pose a question
stitutional course33and
0
of choice of law.

Justice Scalia's analysis, echoing Blackstone and focusing on separation
of powers concerns, recalls Hart's assertion that: "The root of this evil
[formalism] is preoccupation with the separation of powers and Blackstone's 'childish fiction' (as Austin termed it) that judges only 'find,'
never 'make,' law."' 33 1 While it would be unfair and inaccurate to label
332
Justice Scalia as a naive adherent to Blackstone's declaratory theory,
his conception of the judicial role clearly is more "formal" than that of
333
either his fellow Justices or H.L.A. Hart.

Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice Scalia that prospectivity in
any form "violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication. '334 But
while Justice Scalia's objections to prospectivity centered on the separation of powers, Justice Blackmun phrased his discussion more in terms of
the judicial role than such formalistic concerns. 335 Justice Blackmun observed that:
329. See infra notes 332-337 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Blackmun's
criticism.
330. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2450 (Scalia, J., concurring). For additional insight into Justice
Scalia's views on the admissibility of coerced confessions, see Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.
Ct. 1246, 1263-66 (1991), in which Justice Scalia joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's holding that
the admission of a coerced confession may be harmless error.
331. Hart, supra note 39, at 610.
332. See supra note 33 (noting Justice Scalia's acknowledgment in Beam that courts sometimes do make law).
333. A significant body of scholarship already exists analyzing Justice Scalia's opinions as
formalist. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Scalia and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Foolish
Formalism?, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1717 (1991) (criticizing Justice Scalia's integrated approach
to Commerce Clause cases); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New"
Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (1991) (criticizing Justice Scalia's textualist approach to statutory interpretation). While his approach may recall formalism, Justice Scalia's
ultimate conclusion regarding nonretroactivity is very similar to that reached by Justice
Harlan (and Justice Blackmun): it is incompatible with the Court's duty to decide cases and
controversies.
334. Beam, IlI S. Ct. at 2449 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
335. In this vein, Justice Blackmun states that:
The nature ofjudicial review constrains us to consider the case that is actually before
us, and if it requires us to announce a new rule, to do so in the context of the case and
apply it to the parties who brought us the case to decide. To do otherwise is to warp
the role that we, as judges, play in a government of limited powers.
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By announcing new rules prospectively or by applying them selectively, a court may dodge the stare decisis bullet by avoiding the disruption of settled expectations that otherwise prevents us from
disturbing our settled precedents. Because it forces us to consider the
disruption that our new decisional rules cause, retroactivity combines
us from altering the law each time the
with stare decisis to prevent
336
opportunity presents itself.

This mention of the "stare decisis bullet" seems aimed directly at Justice
O'Connor and her fellow dissenters, who evince a notable willingness to
alter the law each time the opportunity presents itself. Justice Blackmun's analysis and proposed rule of retroactivity echo Justice Harlan's
approach. 3 37 They also coincide with H.L.A. Hart's views. For Hart,
courts perform a rule-making function "at the margin of rules"; 338 that
is, as an adjunct of their duty to adjudicate individual cases. Ultimately,
be carefully guided by consideratheir forays into rule-making should
339
tions of stare decisis and legality.
(4) The Dissenting Opinion

In a dissent that flowed naturally from her plurality opinion in
Smith, 340 Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, criticized the approaches taken by Justices Souter, Blackmun, and Scalia. 34 1 According to Justice O'Connor, Justice Souter erred
in basing his conclusion on " 'principles of equality and stare decisis.'...
[For] both of these factors lead to precisely the opposite result. '342 As
for Justices Blackmun and Scalia's suggestion that all decisions automatiId. at 2450. '
336. Id. at 2450 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
337. Id. at 2449-50. Specifically, Justice Blackmun argues that prospective decisionmaking is inequitable and undermines the integrity of judicial review. See id.; see also supra notes
97-117 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Harlan's criticisms); infra Part III.A. (proposing adoption of Justice Harlan's approach).
338. HART, supra note 45, at 132.
339. See id. at 132-35 (discussing courts' rule making function and the importance of predictability in a legal system); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1761 (According to Hart
"[j]udges thus stick close to the lawbooks in rendering decisions, as they weigh and balance
'principles, policies, and standards' in a manner that is tightly structured by the nature of
judicial office.")
340. In Smith Justice O'Connor wrote that application of Chevron Oil mandated that the
rule established by Scheiner (a decision she had dissented from, see American Trucking Ass'ns
v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 298-303 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)) be given purely prospective effect. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2331-33 (1990); see supra
notes 214-226 and accompanying text. Similarly, in Beam, Justice O'Connor voted to limit the
retroactive application of a decision (Bacchus) she disagrees with. See Beam, 111 S. Ct. at
dissenting); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 278 (1984) (Ste2451 (O'Connor, J.,
vens, J., dissenting, joined by O'Connor and Rehnquist, JJ.).
341. Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor does not
mention Justice White's separate concurrence.
342. Id at 2451 (quoting id. at 2446 (plurality opinion of Souter, J.)).
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cally be given retroactive effect, Justice O'Connor noted that she already
"explained last Term [in Smith] that such a rule ignores well-settled precedent in which this Court has refused repeatedly to apply new rules
'343
retroactively in civil cases.
Indeed, Justice O'Connor saw "no need to repeat that discussion."' 344 She did take the time, however, to refute briefly the criticism
that prospective decisionmaking is incompatible with the Court's role as
constitutional adjudicator:
[P]recisely because this Court has "the power 'to say what the law
is,'" when the Court changes its mind, the law changes with it. If the
Court decides, in the context of a civil case or controversy, to change
the law, it must make the subsequent determination whether the new
law or the old is to apply to conduct occurring before the law-changing
decision. Chevron Oil
345 describes our long-established procedure for
making this inquiry.
Justice O'Connor's statement reflects a starkly positivist outlook; she apparently saw no conflict at all between nonretroactivity and the Court's
role as constitutional arbiter. Neither the concern over norms of constitutional adjudication that animate Justice Blackmun's opinion, nor the
focus on separation of powers that drives Justice Scalia's analysis, seem
to matter much to Justice O'Connor. Simply because the Court has the
power to say what the law is, it necessarily can say when and to whom it
applies.
Most of Justice O'Connor's criticism was saved for Justice Souter
and his asserted reliance on principles of equality and stare decisis. As
for equality, Justice O'Connor declared that the plurality's focus on the
relative fairness to the litigants in Bacchus and Beam was misplaced: "If
Justice Souter is concerned with fairness, he cannot ignore Chevron Oil;
the purpose of the Chevron Oil test is to determine the equities of retroactive application of a new rule."' 346 In her view, the real inequity lies in
"impos[ing] liability on every jurisdiction in the Nation that reasonably
relied on pre-Bacchus law."' 347 And with regard to Justice Souter's asserted reliance on stare decisis, Justice O'Connor contended that this
principle "cuts the other way in this case.... A decision not to apply a
new rule retroactively is based on principles of stare decisis. By not applying a law-changing decision retroactively, a court respects the settled
expectations that have built up around the old law."'348 Here, however,
Justice O'Connor unwisely injected remedial concerns such as reliance
into the choice of law analysis. This led her to a conclusion-nonretro343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Id. (citing American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 2327-43 (1990)).
Id.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting id.at 2451 (Scalia, J.,concurring)).
Id. at 2452.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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activity works in concert with stare decisis-that is exactly opposite to
the logical one-nonretroactivity allows courts to change the law more
often by lessening the disruption such judicial activism otherwise would
349
cause.
After criticizing the Court's decision, Justice O'Connor analyzed
Beam under Chevron Oil. This analysis, strongly reminiscent of her pluto the conclusion
rality opinion in Smith, 350 leads, somewhat predictably,
35 1
that Bacchus should not be given retroactive effect.
More interesting than Justice O'Connor's by-the-numbers Chevron
Oil analysis is her subsequent focus on the policy considerations underlying her position. After noting that two identical refund actions, in which
plaintiffs are seeking refunds of nearly twenty-eight million dollars, are
currently pending in the Georgia courts, she asserted:
To impose on Georgia and the other States that reasonably relied on
this Court's established precedent such extraordinary retroactive liability, at a time when most States are struggling to fund even the most
basic services, is the height of unfairness.
We are not concerned here with a State that reaped an unconstitutional windfall from its taxpayers. Georgia collected in good faith
what was at the time a constitutional tax. The Court now subjects the
State to potentially devastating liability without fair warning. This
burden will fall not on some corrupt state government, but ultimately
citizens of Georgia in the form of
on the blameless and unexpecting3 52
higher taxes and reduced benefits.
Surprisingly, Justice O'Connor's dissent is the only one of the five Beam
opinions to address Georgia's legitimate fiscal concerns; the other four
opinions focus exclusively on the theory of retroactivity. By addressing
349. Perhaps more than anything else, Justice O'Connor's conclusion reflects the Rehnquist Court's sometimes ambivalent attitude toward stare decisis. In particular, Justice Scalia
and Chief Justice Rehnquist tend to discount the binding force of precedent. E.g., Robert A.
Burt, Precedentand Authority in Antonin Scalia'sJurisprudence,12 CARDOZO L. REV.1685,
1685 (1991) ("More openly than any other Justice sitting today, Antonin Scalia is ready to
reverse prior Supreme Court precedent); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1761 (citing the
Chief Justice's opinion in Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990), as an arguable exemplar
of an "unconstrained" approach to judicial lawmaking).
350. See supra notes 218-225 and accompanying text (describing Smith plurality's application of Chevron Oil); see also supra notes 273-289 and accompanying text (criticizing Smith
plurality's result-oriented analysis).
351. Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2453-56 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Bacchus easily meets the
first [Chevron Oil] criterion ....
There is nothing in the nature of the Bacchus rule that dictates
retroactive application .... [T]he equities weigh heavily against retroactive application of
[Bacchus]."). This conclusion is especially predictable in light of the fact that Justices
O'Connor and Rehnquist both dissented from the rule-changing decision in Bacchus. See
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 278 (1984) (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor and
Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). Beam thus provides yet another example of an attempt to use
nonretroactivity to limit the effect of a distasteful decision. See supra notes 261-262, 266-268
and accompanying text (discussing this phenomenon).
352. Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2455-56 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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retroactivity's potential practical impact, the dissent reminds us that the
dilemma these cases pose arises from the conflict between fiscal stability
and fundamental fairness.
Unfortunately, Beam is of little help in solving this dilemma; the
Court seems hopelessly deadlocked when it comes to deciding constitutional tax refund cases. Suggesting the contours of a new approach is the
task to which this Note now turns.

III. Proposal
The dilemma posed by the constitutional tax refund cases ultimately
reflects the inherent conflict between fundamental fairness-the taxpayer's interest in obtaining relief-and fiscal stability-the state's interest in preserving the fisc. To date, the Supreme Court has failed to
balance these competing interests in a fair and practical manner. Instead, the Justices have become caught up in a divisive jurisprudential
debate over the propriety of prospective decisionmaking. As Smith and
Beam illustrate, this focus on nonretroactivity has led to "a tangle of
353
confusions."
To clear away the confusion first requires untangling the two
threads of retroactivity. The constitutional tax refund cases need to be
understood in terms of two distinct retroactivity questions: first, the
choice of law determination; and second, the remedial inquiry. 3 54 While
the Court professes to recognize and follow this distinction, 355 much of
the confusion created by Smith and Beam results from the tendency to
intermingle these two discrete issues. This Note now attempts to untangle the two threads. First, it proposes that Justice Harlan's approach to
the choice of law question be adopted. Second, it suggests the contours
of a new remedial framework that builds upon the foundation provided
by McKesson.
A. The Proper Choice of Law
Earlier parts of this Note have detailed the flaws in the Court's current approach to retroactivity in constitutional tax refund cases and described the confusion this approach has generated. 356 Indeed, Smith and
Beam demonstrate the acuity of Justice Harlan's vision, for the Court
has sunk deep into a civil retroactivity quagmire. Not only did Justice
Harlan foresee this happening, he also proposed the most sensible solution to the choice of law question: new rules should be applied retroac353. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1736.
354. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
355. See, e.g., Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2443; American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
2323, 2331 (1990).
356. See supra Parts II.C. & II.D.
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tively to all cases still subject to direct review at the time of the
357
decision.
The most compelling argument in favor of this approach is also the
simplest-the practice of applying rules determined to be wrong to disputes not yet fully adjudicated is fundamentally inequitable. 358 In a system that aspires to do justice, courts should decide disputes according to
their best current understanding of the law; to apply the "wrong" rule
seems inherently unfair. Justice Harlan's approach guarantees the correct rule will be applied to all claims that still may be adjudicated.
A closely related justification for a rule of retroactivity is that prospective decisionmaking is incompatible with the common conception of
judicial review. The Court plays its proper constitutional role by adjudicating cases and controversies according to its current understanding of
the law; prospective decisionmaking, by contrast, is not adjudication, but
legislation. 359 Moreover, nonretroactivity "conflicts with the norm of
principled decisionmaking" by encouraging courts to decide cases on
grounds other than the merits. 36° The proposed rule of retroactivity, on
the other hand, comports with the Court's duty to decide cases and controversies and is fully compatible with commonly accepted norms of constitutional adjudication.
Once divorced from remedial considerations, the choice of law question is easily addressed. As the Court acknowledged by largely adopting
his approach to criminal retroactivity, 36 1 Justice Harlan's arguments are
compelling. And as discussed earlier, his arguments apply with at least
equal force in civil cases. In the constitutional tax refund cases, however,
the abstract appeal of a rule of retroactivity has been overwhelmed by the
spectre of state treasuries drained by refund claims. Thus, Chevron Oil
survives despite the correctness of Justice Harlan's approach. This result
exemplifies the error of tangling together the two threads of retroactivity.
357. See United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 295-96 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); supra text accompanying note 138. As Justice Souter notes in Beam, the corollary issue-whether new rules should apply to conduct no longer subject to direct review-is
far less relevant in the civil than in the criminal sphere, since "there is little opportunity for
collateral attack of final [civil] judgments." Beam, I ll S. Ct. at 2446. Although the situation
may not often arise in the civil arena, according to Justice Harlan's approach, new rules should
not apply retroactively if either the statute of limitations has run with no claim brought or if a
final judgment has been entered. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. at 296 (Harlan, J., concurring).
358. See Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. at 296 (Harlan, J., concurring).
359. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676-81 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting). The criticism leveled here at nonretroactivity should be distinguished from that
leveled by Justice Scalia. He argues that prospective decisionmaking is wrong because it is
outside the Court's Article III powers. See Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2450 (Scalia, J., concurring).
This discussion focuses not on specific Article III limitations, but rather on the norms of constitutional adjudication.
360. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 546 (1982) (citing Mackey, 401 U.S. at 676
(Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting)).

361.

See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987).
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Because of its focus on essentially remedial concerns, the Court has chosen to allow the wrong law to be applied. Legitimate concern for the
state's fiscal stability should factor into the remedial inquiry. It should
not, however, taint the choice of law decision. Proceeding from the assumption that a rule of automatic retroactivity is correct, the next section
describes a remedial framework for resolving the second thread of the
retroactivity dilemma.
B. Building a Better Remedy
It is within the remedial context that the basic conflict between fundamental fairness and fiscal stability must be resolved. To strike the
proper balance between the two requires an understanding of the interests of both the taxpayer and the state. The solution proposed here takes
inspiration from McKesson's discussion of fundamental fairness to the
taxpayer. The next section of this Note examines the taxpayer's interests, concluding that the proper approach favors a certain remedy for
unconstitutional deprivations. The subsequent section addresses the interests of the state, acknowledging that in rare circumstances these may
override the individual's right to a remedy.
(1) McKesson and the Right to a Refund
Previous parts of this Note have suggested that McKesson delivers
less than it promises. 362 But McKesson is not so flawed as to be totally
worthless. On the contrary, it reflects the concept that forms the basis of
the proposed solution: the Fourteenth Amendment gives taxpayers the
right to due process of law; violation of this right deserves a certain
363
remedy.
In their recent article Professors Fallon and Meltzer posit that two
underlying principles form the basis for the right to a constitutional remedy. The first is Marbury v. Madison's remedial ideal: for every violation of a right there must be a remedy. 364 The second principle is
structural: the existence of constitutional remedies helps ensure that the
government acts within the bounds of the law. 365 In the context of constitutional tax refund cases, the taxpayer's right to a remedy is founded
on two interests. The first is equitable; individual wrongs should be
righted. The second interest is more utilitarian. Imposing a remedy
should deter future constitutional violations. McKesson's true significance lies in its implicit recognition of these principles.
Recall that in McKesson, the fact that Florida had provided no
predeprivation relief was dispositive. Only because the state had pro362. See supra notes 195-199, 290-291 and accompanying text.
363. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
364. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1778 (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163).
365. Id. at 1778-79.
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vided no "procedural safeguards against unlawful exactions" was it required to render meaningful backward looking relief,366 In other words,
McKesson provides the states with a clear choice: either provide taxpayers with a "meaningful opportunity" to challenge the exaction in a
predeprivation hearing,3 67 or risk being required to remedy any unconstitutional deprivation. This insistence on predeprivation procedures is
wholly consistent with the principles underlying the right to a constitutional remedy. By treating the availability of such procedures as a requirement, the Court emphasizes that it is protecting the individual's
right to due process. Additionally, by focusing on governmental procedures, the Court properly emphasizes that the burden should be on the
state to make sure its actions comport with constitutional requirements.
This seems the ideal answer to the dilemma posed-the states move to
protect their own fiscal interests by establishing fair procedures, thus ensuring that individual due process rights are protected.3 68 This ideal,
however, is of little use when confronted with the fact that today several
369
states face potentially devastating retroactive tax refund liabilities.
The following section considers the way in which state interests fit into
the proposed framework.
(2) State Interests
Dissenting in Beam, Justice O'Connor protested that it "is the
height of unfairness [to impose] such extraordinary retroactive liability,
at a time when most States are struggling to fund even the most basic
services. 37 0 This potential threat to the public welfare, that retroactivity
will adversely impact the state's ability to meet its responsibilities, is the
only interest that should be weighed against the individual's right to due
process of law. States' purported "equitable" considerations, 3 7 1 such as
reliance, should not factor into the equation, since the motivations of the
individual government actor(s) responsible for the constitutional violation are irrelevant in this context. Whether or not any specific actor is
blameworthy does not change the fact that the state has violated the taxpayer's due process rights by requiring payment of an unconstitutional
levy. There simply is no reason not to require the state to return what
366. McKesson, 110 S.Ct. at 2250; see supra text accompanying note 181.
367. See McKesson, 110 S. Ct. at 2251 & n.21.
368. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 182 ("[Tlhe great merit of McKesson lies in its
promise for the future.").
369. See supra note 10.
370. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 2455 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
371. See Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2454-55 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); American Trucking
Ass'ns v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 2333 (1990) (plurality opinion).
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has been wrongly exacted in these circumstances. 372 Moreover, such a
rule has a corrollary benefit: its very certainty makes it a potential deter3 73
rent to future governmental misconduct.
This rule of strict liability must be tempered, however. As Justice
O'Connor persuasively argues in Beam, it would be inherently unfair to
impose severe hardships on blameless citizens for the unwise actions of
their legislators. Therefore, if a state facing massive retroactive liability
demonstrates that requiring it to tender refunds would work a severe
hardship on the state, then payment may be excused. 374 A severe hardship must be understood to include only those situations in which the
citizens of the state, as a collective body, clearly would face a substantial
adverse impact, for example, by cuts in essential services or significant
increases in taxes. Only if such a showing is made should the individual
taxpayer's right to due process be subordinated to the public interest.
IV.

Conclusion

One year before McKesson and Smith were decided, a prominent
commentator noted that "[t]he Supreme Court's outpouring of significant state tax decisions in recent years has elicited little more than a
yawn from most constitutional scholars. ' 375 Since then, developments
have brought the Court's state taxation decisions into the limelight. Facing potentially devastating retroactive liability, the states are now undoubtedly paying close attention to these developments. And at the
academic level, the recent cases raise intriguing questions regarding the
scope of constitutional remedies and the very nature of judicial review.
The discussion in this Note has focused on resolving the dilemma
that animates constitutional tax refund cases: how to balance individual
due process rights against the state's considerable interest in fiscal health.
The analysis has illustrated the flaws in the Court's current approach.
Tangling remedial and jurisprudential questions together, Smith and
Beam do not address the dilemma in a fair and practical manner, but
instead sow confusion regarding the current and future state of the law.
This Note proposes a solution based on the remedial principles that un372. Cf United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984) (evidence obtained in good faith
reliance on invalid search warrant not subject to exclusionary rule).
373. A certain rule also may encourage parties to choose settlement over lengthy
litigation.
374. Professors Fallon & Meltzer, on the other hand, believe that "a standard that weights
fiscal distress would be extremely difficult for courts to administer." Fallon & Meltzer, supra
note 10, at 1829-30. While there is truth in this assessment, courts make equally difficult
assessments in other areas, particularly in calculating damages and in issuing and administering equitable relief. Undoubtedly, a multitude of economists, political scientists, and other
experts would be prepared to testify as to what constitutes fiscal distress.
375. Hellerstein, State Taxation, supra note 9, at 223.

472
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derlie McKesson, one that attempts to squarely face the practical considerations which make these cases so difficult.

